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ARCTIC BOTTLENECK: PROTECTING THE 
BERING STRAIT REGION FROM INCREASED 
VESSEL TRAFFIC  
Andrew Hartsig,* Ivy Fredrickson,** Carmen Yeung*** and 
Stan Senner**** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change in the circumpolar Arctic is reducing seasonal sea 
ice coverage and leading to longer periods when the ocean surface is 
relatively ice-free. The reduction in the temporal and geographic extent 
of sea ice is in turn driving increased interest in the pursuit of 
commercial and industrial activities throughout the Arctic, including oil 
and gas exploration and development, mining, tourism, and shipping. 
While these activities are already affecting various parts of the Arctic 
Ocean, the Bering Strait and surrounding waters are likely to experience 
especially significant impacts due to the increased vessel traffic 
associated with the expansion of commercial activity. 
Sea ice covers the Bering Strait region for much of the year, and the 
area is subject to severe weather and strong ocean currents. Despite the 
harsh environment, these waters are remarkably productive. Fish and 
wildlife—including a wide variety of marine mammals and seabirds—
make extensive use of the area, and many species use the Bering Strait as 
a vital migration corridor. Moreover, the people residing in Bering Strait 
communities are an integral part of the region’s rich ecosystem. For 
thousands of years they have depended on the marine resources of the 
region to support their way of life.  
As seasonal sea ice diminishes and industrial activity in the Arctic 
grows, the Bering Strait will continue to experience increasing levels of 
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vessel traffic. Increased maritime traffic in the narrow, often icy waters 
of the Bering Strait could elevate the risk of maritime accidents that lead 
to injury and loss of life. Increased vessel traffic may also result in more 
pollution, ship strikes on marine mammals, chronic and catastrophic 
spills, and other unanticipated environmental impacts. These threats are 
of particular concern due to the region’s lack of infrastructure and 
limited resources to support search and rescue, spill response, and 
restoration activities. In a part of the ocean as biologically rich and 
fragile as the Bering Strait region, these increased environmental impacts 
could have serious consequences. 
At present, there are few protective measures in place to improve 
safety, reduce the risk of accidents, or mitigate environmental impacts 
associated with increased commercial vessel traffic in the Bering Strait 
and surrounding waters. With vessel traffic in the region likely to expand 
significantly, the status quo must change. Given the Bering Strait 
region’s status as a gateway between the Pacific and Arctic oceans, its 
significance as a wildlife migration corridor, its biological productivity, 
and its importance to the subsistence economies of surrounding 
communities, the United States should work with the Russian Federation 
and the international community to adopt and implement heightened 
safety, prevention, management, and mitigation measures in order to 
protect the region from the impacts of increased vessel traffic.  
This Article outlines the environmental and socio-economic 
characteristics of the Bering Strait region, explores the legal framework 
that governs shipping traffic in the Strait, identifies the institutions that 
are best positioned to adopt and implement changes in policy and 
governance, and examines the legal tools and instruments available to 
regulate vessel traffic that will improve safety and protect the people and 
biological resources of the region. Part II of this Article describes some 
of the attributes of the Bering Strait and its surrounding waters, including 
geographical features, the role of seasonal sea ice, biological 
characteristics, neighboring human communities, and the ongoing and 
anticipated impacts of climate change and ocean acidification. Part III 
describes the status and expected future growth of maritime traffic in the 
region. Part IV of this Article explains the overarching legal regime 
established by customary international law and the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with particular emphasis on those 
portions of the law that relate to international straits, ecologically 
important areas, and ice-covered waters. Part V identifies and describes 
institutions that could facilitate the adoption and implementation of 
improved safety and environmental protection measures in the Bering 
Strait region and evaluates some of the specific instruments and tools 
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that these institutions could employ. Finally, Part VI recommends that 
the United States, the Russian Federation, other Arctic nations, and the 
international community act now—in advance of a crisis—to adopt and 
implement specific measures designed to improve safety, reduce the 
threat of accidents, and prevent and mitigate environmental threats that 
are likely to develop as a result of increased vessel traffic in the Bering 
Strait region. 
II.  PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE 
BERING STRAIT REGION  
The Bering Strait and surrounding waters are a unique part of the 
global ocean. Although sea ice covers the area for much of the year, the 
Bering Strait is the only marine gateway between the Pacific and the 
Arctic oceans. Biologically, it is tremendously productive and provides a 
habitat and a migration corridor for a diverse array of species. People 
living in the region’s communities practice a subsistence way of life that 
is dependent on the continued productivity and composition of the 
region’s marine ecosystem. At the same time, the region is already 
feeling the effects of rapid climate change and ocean acidification. The 
following sections offer more detail on these attributes of the Bering 
Strait region.  
A.  Geography and Seasonal Sea Ice in the Bering Strait Region 
This Article refers to the northern Bering Sea, the Bering Strait, and 
the southern Chukchi Sea as the “Bering Strait region.” The region 
includes the marine area between North America and Asia from roughly 
63º and 69º north latitude; it extends from St. Lawrence Island and the 
northern Bering Sea north through the Bering Strait to the southern 
Chukchi Sea and Cape Lisburne. 
The northern Bering Sea includes Chirikov Basin, which spans 
across United States and Russian waters north of St. Lawrence Island and 
west of Norton Sound.1 In the southern Chukchi Sea north of the Bering 
Strait lies Hope Basin. It is relatively shallow, with water depths ranging 
from roughly 65 to 200 feet.2 The Bering Strait itself is a narrow stretch 
of ocean that separates Alaska’s Seward Peninsula on the east from the 
                                            
 1. Melanie A. Smith, Place-based Summary of the Arctic Marine Synthesis 
(Audubon Alaska) Sept. 2011, at 11, available at http://ak.audubon.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/place-based_summary_of_the_arctic_marine_synthesis_final.pdf.    
 2. Id. at 23. 
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Russian Federation’s Chukotka Peninsula on the west.3 The Strait is 
approximately 55 miles wide at its narrowest point, and its maximum 
depth is less than 200 feet.4 Big Diomede Island (Russian Federation) 
and Little Diomede Island (United States) lie roughly in the middle of the 
passage.5 However, above all, the Bering Strait is the only direct marine 
passage between the Pacific and Arctic oceans.  
In the Chirikov Basin, three major ocean currents meet before 
flowing north through the Bering Strait and into Hope Basin.6 This 
northerly flow of nutrients sustains a huge biomass of benthic 
invertebrates,7 marine mammals,8 and seabirds.9 In Hope Basin, the three 
ocean currents are joined by a fourth current that typically flows east 
along the northern Chukotka coast.10 Together, these currents full of 
relatively warm and nutrient-rich water serve as nourishment to high 
levels of phytoplankton, zooplankton, and benthic productivity.11 
In addition to the mix and flow of ocean currents, the seasonal 
advance and retreat of sea ice plays a critical role in the Bering Strait 
region. Typically, ice forms in the region in October or November and 
remains until May, June, or July.12 This sea ice is not a continuous, 
uniform sheet; it is a dynamic, diverse, ever-changing habitat. First-year 
sea ice can become more than a meter thick over the course of the winter, 
and thicker multi-year pack ice from the Arctic Ocean is sometimes 
pushed south through the Bering Strait and into the Bering Sea.13 
                                            
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. Id. at 15. 
 5. Id. at 17. 
 6. L.K. COACHMAN ET AL., BERING STRAIT: THE REGIONAL PHYSICAL 
OCEANOGRAPHY 75-76 (1975).  
 7. Jacqueline M. Grebmeier & C. Peter McRoy, Pelagic-Benthic Coupling on the 
Shelf of the Northern Bering and Chukchi Seas. III. Benthic Food Supply and Carbon 
Cycling, 53 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 79, 87-88 (1989). 
 8. Sue E. Moore et al., Cetacean Habitat Selection in the Alaskan Arctic During 
Summer and Autumn, 53 ARCTIC 432, 443-45 (2000). 
 9. Alan M. Springer et al., The Paradox of Pelagic Food Webs in the Northern 
Bering Sea—I. Seabird Food Habits, 7 CONT’L SHELF RESEARCH 895, 909 (1987).  
 10. Thomas J. Weingartner et al., The Siberian Coastal Current: A Wind- and 
Buoyancy-forced Arctic Coastal Current, 104 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 697, 706-
707 (1999).  
 11. P.J. Stabeno et al., Physical Forcing of Ecosystem Dynamics on the Bering Sea 
Shelf, THE SEA: THE GLOBAL COASTAL OCEAN (Allan R. Robinson and Kenneth Brink 
eds., 2005), available at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/pubs/outstand/stab2529/ 
northern_shelf.shtml. 
 12. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 106 (2009) 
[hereinafter AMSA 2009].  
 13. Id.  
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Currents and wind move sea ice at speeds as high as twenty-seven 
nautical miles per day.14 These ice floes, driven by wind and currents, 
may collide with each other and form significant ridges on the ice 
surface.15 As sea ice melts, it affects the salinity and density of ocean 
water, changing ocean circulation patterns across hundreds of square 
miles.16  
B.  Biological Attributes of the Bering Strait Region 
The icy waters of the Bering Strait region provide a habitat for a 
broad array of species. Dozens of species of birds use the region for 
breeding, migrating, and/or foraging.17 These include short-tailed 
albatross, spectacled eiders, and Steller’s eiders—all of which are listed 
as threatened or endangered species under the Endangered Species Act.18 
The Strait also provides a key breeding, pupping, feeding, and migratory 
habitat for many species of marine mammals.19 Beluga whales, bowhead 
whales, gray whales, Pacific walruses, polar bears, and four species of 
ice-dependent seals—bearded, ribbon, ringed, and spotted—all depend 
on the region for migrating, feeding, breeding, and/or resting.20 Many of 
these species are also listed, or proposed for listing, under the 
Endangered Species Act.21 The Bering Strait region also includes 
                                            
 14. Id.  
 15. Sea Ice Features: Introduction, NATIONAL SNOW AND ICE DATA CENTER, (Sept. 9, 
2012), http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/characteristics-features-intro.html. 
 16. Dagmar Budikova, Role of Arctic Sea Ice in Global Atmospheric Circulation: A 
Review, 68 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 149, 153 (2009). 
 17. Smith, supra note 1, at 17.  
 18. Id.; see also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Lowry et al., Feeding of Bearded Seals in the Bering and 
Chukchi Seas and Trophic Interaction with Pacific Walruses, 33 ARCTIC 330, 340 
(1980); Jacqueline M. Grebmeier & Nancy M. Harrison, Seabird Feeding on Benthic 
Amphipods Facilitated by Gray Whale Activity on the Northern Bering Sea, 80 MARINE 
ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 125, 131 (1992); Donald M. Schell, Declining Carrying 
Capacity in the Bering Sea: Isotopic Evidence from Whale Baleen, 45 LIMNOLOGY & 
OCEANOGRAPHY 459, 459 (2000); Gay Sheffield & Jacqueline M. Grebmeier, Pacific 
Walrus (Odobenus Rosmarus Divergens): Differential Prey Digestion and Diet, 25 
MARINE MAMMAL SCIENCE 761, 761-63 (2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 7-12, 15-18, 23-24. 
 21. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (listing bowhead whales as endangered, polar bears as 
threatened, and Steller sea lions as threatened (east of 144º west longitude) and 
endangered (west of 144º west longitude)); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and 
Plants; Review of Native Species That Are Candidates for Listing As Endangered or 
Threatened, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,370, 66,431 (Oct. 26, 2011) (naming the Pacific walrus as a 
candidate for listing pursuant to the Endangered Species Act); Endangered and 
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designated essential fish habitat for Arctic cod, saffron cod, snow crab, 
and five species of Pacific salmon.22  
As the only marine corridor connecting the Pacific and Arctic 
oceans, all wildlife that migrates to the Chukchi and Beaufort seas during 
the summer months must pass through the bottleneck of the Bering Strait 
twice per year during their spring and fall migrations.23 Similarly, many 
migratory birds and mammals gather in the Chirikov Basin in the spring 
and follow the retreating ice edge north through the Bering Strait.24 As a 
result, the Bering Strait is a pathway for millions of seabirds and 
hundreds of thousands of marine mammals every year.25  
These yearly migrations are essential to people living in Bering Strait 
communities and beyond. One species of particular subsistence 
importance is the bowhead whale. The Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort stock of 
bowhead whales numbers around 10,500 individuals.26 These whales 
winter in the Bering Sea and migrate north in the spring, following leads 
in the sea ice in the eastern Chukchi Sea until they pass Point Barrow, 
                                                                                                  
Threatened Species; Proposed Threatened Status for Subspecies of the Ringed Seal, 75 
Fed. Reg. 77,476, 77,476 (Dec. 10, 2010) (proposing subspecies of ringed seal for listing 
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act); Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed 
Threatened and Not Warranted Status for Subspecies and Distinct Population Segments 
of the Bearded Seal, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,496, 77,496 (Dec. 10, 2010) (issuing a proposed 
rule to list the Beringia and Okhotsk distinct population segments of the bearded seal as 
threatened species pursuant to the Endangered Species Act). 
 22. See FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR FISH RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC 
MANAGEMENT AREA, NORTH PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL (2009) 
http://www.alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/npfmc/PDFdocuments/fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf 
(showing essential fish habitat for Arctic cod, saffron cod, and snow crab); APPENDIX D 
EFH TEXT AND MAP DESCRIPTIONS FOR FEDERALLY MANAGED SPECIES OF THE ALASKA 
REGION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERY SERV.  D-158-60 (2005) 
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/habitat/seis/final/Volume_II/Appendix_D.pdf (describing 
essential fish habitat for five Pacific salmon species).  
 23. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Lowry et. al., Movements and Behavior of Satellite-tagged 
Spotted Seals (Phoca Largha) in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, 19 POLAR BIOLOGY 221, 
228-29 (1998); Howard W. Braham et al., Spring Migration of the Western Arctic 
Population of Bowhead Whales, 42 MARINE FISHERIES REV. 36, 39 (1980); Thomas 
Alerstam et al., A Polar System of Intercontinental Bird Migration, 274 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE ROYAL SOCIETY BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 2523, 2525 (2007). 
 24. Smith, supra note 1, at 11.   
 25. Id. at 15. 
 26. Judith E. Zeh & Andreá E. Punt, Updated 1978-2001 Abundance Estimates and 
Their Correlations for the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas Stock of Bowhead Whales, 7 J. 
OF CETACEAN RESEARCH & MGMT. 169, 173 (2005). 
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where they then travel east toward the southeastern Beaufort Sea.27 
During the summer, they range throughout the Beaufort Sea, where they 
feed.28 From early September to mid-October, some of these whales 
migrate toward the Chukotka Peninsula29 while others head toward 
Wrangel Island.30 Once they reach these locations, the whales move 
southeast toward the Bering Strait and back into the Bering Sea for 
winter.31 In other words, nearly the entire Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort stock 
of bowhead whales—some 10,500 individuals—move through the 
narrow passage of the Bering Strait twice each year.  
Interestingly, the sea ice that covers the ocean for much of the year is 
a significant driver of ecological processes in the Bering Strait region. 
The ice provides a habitat for photosynthetic algae, which are released 
into the water as the ice melts in the spring and summer.32 This fosters 
phytoplankton blooms that are crucial to biological productivity.33 On 
average, ice algae are responsible for more than half of the total marine 
primary production in the central Arctic.34 The ice also provides a habitat 
for invertebrates, fish, birds, and marine mammals. Zooplankton 
consume ice algae35 and use the ice as a place of refuge from predators.36 
Arctic cod use the sea ice as a nursery ground.37 Arctic cod, in turn, are 
an important food source for many marine mammals and birds.38 Walrus, 
                                            
 27. Howard W. Braham et al., Bowhead and White Whale Migration, Distribution and 
Abundance in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas, 1975-78, NOAA TECH. REP. 
SSRF-778, 17-19 (1984).  
 28. Sue E. Moore & Janet T. Clarke, Estimates of Bowhead Whale (Balaena 
Mysticetus) Numbers in the Beaufort Sea During Late Summer, 44 ARCTIC 43, 43-44 
(1991). 
 29. Sue E. Moore et al., Bowhead Whales Along the Chukotka Coast in Autumn, 48 
ARCTIC 155, 157-158 (1995). 
 30. David Rugh et al., A Review of Bowhead Whale (Balaenga Mysticetus) Stock 
Identity, 5 J. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH & MGMT. 267, 271 (2003).   
 31. Id.   
 32. Christopher Krembs & Jody Deming, Sea Ice: A Refuge for Life in Polar Seas? 
NOAA ARCTIC THEME PAGE, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/essay_krembsdeming.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 33. Id.   
 34. Michel Gosselin et al., New Measurements of Phytoplankton and Ice Algal 
Production in the Arctic Ocean, 44 DEEP-SEA RESEARCH 1623, 1639 (1997).  
 35. Michael S.W. Bradstreet, Trophic Relationships at High Arctic Ice Edges, 35 
ARCTIC 1, 10 (1982). 
 36. Krembs & Deming, supra note 32.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
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seals, whales, and polar bears use the ice for migrating, resting, and as 
protection while rearing their young.39  
High primary production coupled with relatively low zooplankton 
grazing means that much organic matter sinks to the seafloor, where it 
enhances benthic production.40 As a result, the Bering Sea region 
contains some of the highest levels of soft-bottom benthic faunal biomass 
in the world.41 Chirikov and Hope basins in particular are hotspots for 
both primary productivity and benthic foraging.42 The region’s abundant 
benthic communities support a variety of benthic-feeding predators, 
including demersal fish, diving ducks, walruses, gray whales, and 
bearded seals.43 In short, the physical and biological features of the 
Bering Strait region combine in a way that supports vast numbers of 
marine invertebrates, fish, birds, and mammals. 
C.  Human Communities in the Bering Strait Region 
In addition to supporting an abundance of wildlife, the Bering Strait 
region is home to a number of indigenous communities belonging to the 
Inupiaq, Central Yupik, and Siberian Yupik cultural groups.44 “Marine 
resources are of vital importance to peoples of this region”45 for their 
nutritional, cultural, and economic needs.46 Residents of the region use 
marine resources as a source of clothing and equipment, as material for 
handicrafts, and to support their limited commercial fishing, hunting, and 
ecotourism activities.47  
Residents of Bering Strait communities have hunted marine 
mammals for over 1000 years and continue to depend on marine 
resources for their nutritional value.48 As one Alaska Native put it, “[w]e 
Inupiat are meat eaters, not vegetarians. We live off the sea mammals . . . 
                                            
 39. Id. 
 40. Jacqueline M. Grebmeier et al., Ecosystem Dynamics of the Pacific-influenced 
Northern Bering and Chukchi Seas in the Amerasian Arctic, 71 PROGRESS IN 
OCEANOGRAPHY 331, 332 (2006). 
 41. Id. at 331.  
 42. Smith, supra note 1, at 11, 23.   
 43. Id.  
 44. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 106. Total human population in the Bering Strait 
region is roughly 10,000, and there are 15 permanent villages along the U.S. coast. Id. 
 45. Id. at 107.  
 46. Id. at 108.  For example, the St. Lawrence Island villages of Gambell and 
Savoonga generate more than 95% of their subsistence harvest from marine-based 
resources.  Similarly, in the coastal village of Shishmaref, the figure is roughly 75%.  Id. 
 47. Id. at 107.  
 48. Id. at 106.  
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. The Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea are our gardens.”49 Residents of 
villages like Gambell, Savoonga, Wales, Little Diomede, and Point Hope 
hunt a variety of marine mammals, including bowhead whales, beluga 
whales, walrus, polar bears, and seals.50 For those coastal villages that 
hunt bowhead whales, the hunts are central to their culture and are 
critically important to the community residents.51 One Alaska Native 
whaler explained that 
[t]he whale is more than food to us.  It is the center of our life 
and culture. We are the People of the Whale. The taking and 
sharing of the whale is our Eucharist and Passover. The whaling 
festival is our Easter and Christmas, the Arctic celebrations of 
the mysteries of life.52  
Because of their reliance on marine resources, residents of Bering Strait 
communities depend immensely on an intact ocean ecosystem to support 
their subsistence, economic needs, and cultural traditions.    
D.  Impacts of a Changing Climate and Ocean 
The Bering Strait region is part of a large, fragile Arctic ecosystem 
that is already being stressed and altered by climate change.53 For 
example, the northern Bering Sea, is experiencing a change from Arctic 
to subarctic conditions producing an ecosystem that no longer favors 
benthic communities and bottom-feeding organisms such as sea ducks, 
gray whales, and walruses.54 Consequently, the region is becoming more 
dominated by pelagic fish.55  
                                            
 49. THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE 
REVIEW COMMISSION 48 (1985). 
 50. See ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM., ILITQUSIA AGVIGUM, SPIRIT OF THE 
WHALE: A WAY OF LIFE FOR THE INUPIAT AND YUPIK PEOPLE ii, 7, 14, 17, 18 (2012), 
available at http://aewc-alaska.com/uploads/IWC_Brochure_web.pdf (describing the 
Savoonga, Gambell, Wales, Little Diomede, and Point Hope villages and their 
dependence on whaling). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 1 (explaining the importance of the bowhead whale hunt to North 
Slope communities). 
 52. Rupa Gupta, Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental 
Community: Accommodating Claims Through a Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1741, 1747 (1999) (quoting Alaska native leader of the North Slope, Eben 
Hopson). 
 53. See, e.g., AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 136.  
 54. Jacqueline M. Grebmeier et al., A Major Ecosystem Shift in the Northern Bering 
Sea, 311 SCIENCE 1461, 1461 (2006). 
 55. Id.   
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However, perhaps the most visible evidence of the changing climate 
in the Arctic is a reduction in seasonal sea ice coverage. In 2007, the 
seasonal minimum sea ice extent in the Arctic reached a record low—
resulting in 23% lower ice coverage than had ever been recorded since 
satellite measurements began.56 In 2008, the minimum sea ice extent was 
lower than any year other than 2007.57 Additionally, the ice coverage was 
thinner and more diffused, suggesting that 2008 established a record low 
ice volume.58 In 2011, the seasonal sea ice in the Arctic was nearly as 
low as it was in 2007, even though conditions were not as conducive to 
melting.59 Then, in 2012, seasonal sea ice established a new record low, 
approximately 760,000 square kilometers below the 2007 ice extent.60 
The seasonal sea ice minimums established in each of the six years 
between 2007 and 2011 were the six lowest measurements since satellite 
measurements began.61 The rate at which sea ice cover is declining 
exceeds even the most dramatic predictions from just a few years ago.62 
Consequently, scientists now predict the Arctic could be seasonally ice-
free by 2030.63 
Although scientists do not fully understand the connections between 
sea ice reduction and ecosystem changes, they expect primary 
productivity to change.64 Reductions in sea ice have the potential to 
restructure the ecosystem by reducing benthic production and increasing 
pelagic consumption, possibly resulting in fewer benthic prey for marine 
mammals.65 While the biological consequences of reduced sea ice are 
                                            
 56. Press Release: Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows, NAT’L SNOW & 
ICE DATA CTR., (Oct. 1, 2007), www.nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/ 
20071001_pressrelease.html.    
 57. Id. 
 58. Press Release: Arctic Sea Ice Down to Second-Lowest Extent; Likely Record-Low 
Volume, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR., (Oct. 2, 2008), www.nsidc.org/news/press/ 
2008/1002_seaice_pressrelease.html.  
 59. Press Release: Summer 2011: Arctic Sea Ice Near Record Lows, NSDIC ARCTIC 
NEWS & ANALYSIS, (Oct. 4, 2011), www.nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2011/10/.  
 60. Press Release: Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L 
SNOW & ICE DATA CTR., (Sept. 19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/ 
arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum/.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Jon Vidal, Arctic May Be Ice-Free Within 30 Years, THE GUARDIAN (July 11, 
2011), available at www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/11/arctic-ice-free. 
 63. Id. (quoting the director of the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center as saying 
that “we are on track to see an ice-free summer [in the Arctic] by 2030”).  
 64. Jacqueline M. Grebmeier, et al., Biological Response to Recent Pacific Arctic Sea 
Ice Retreats, 91 EOS, TRANS., AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION 161, 161 (2010). 
 65. Grebmeier et al., supra note 54, at 1462; Chadwick V. Jay et al., Projected Status 
of the Pacific Walrus (Odobenus Rosmarus Divergens) in the Twenty-first Century, 34 
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difficult to predict and depend on regional conditions influencing 
productivity,66 even small changes in the primary production pathways 
can have large cascading effects on higher trophic organisms.67 
Coupled with the change in sea ice coverage, another change 
affecting the Bering Strait region is the process of ocean acidification. 
Ocean acidification is the decrease of pH in the ocean due to the uptake 
of atmospheric carbon dioxide.68 Scientists project that ocean 
acidification will create corrosive surface waters in the Arctic Ocean.69 In 
fact, acidification in the Bering Sea has already caused seasonal calcium 
carbonate mineral suppression in some areas, and it is causing the 
Chukchi Sea to become more corrosive to calcium carbonate.70 This 
change is likely to continue to modify the ecology, physics, and 
biogeochemistry of the Arctic Ocean in ways that are not yet fully 
understood.71 Furthermore, scientists expect that ocean acidification will 
likely reduce the ability of many species to produce shells, which will 
have profound implications on the future of the Arctic marine 
ecosystem.72 
The effects of climate change and ocean acidification are ongoing 
and will continue into the future. In other words, impacts from the 
expansion of industrial activity in the Bering Strait region—such as 
pollution, ship strikes, noise, or oil spills related to increased vessel 
traffic—will not occur in a vacuum. They will be added to and act in 
synergistic ways with the ongoing and continuing effects of climate 
change and ocean acidification on the ecosystem.  
                                                                                                  
POLAR BIOLOGY 1065, 1067 (2011); Sue E. Moore et al., Gray Whale Distribution 
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 68. See, e.g., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
STEERING COMM., NOAA OCEAN AND GREAT LAKES ACIDIFICATION RESEARCH PLAN, 
NOAA SPECIAL REPORT 1-2 (2010) (describing ocean acidification).  
 69. Marco Steinacher et al., Imminent Ocean Acidification in the Arctic Projected 
with the NCAR Global Coupled Carbon Cycle-Climate Model, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES 515, 
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BIOGEOSCIENCES 2433, 2433 (2009).  
 72. Id. 
46 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1 
 
III.  PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED VESSEL TRAFFIC AND  
MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE BERING STRAIT REGION 
Historically, the Bering Strait region has experienced low levels of 
maritime traffic. Despite the hazards presented by sea ice and stormy 
conditions, little infrastructure is in place to ensure ship safety and 
protect the environment. Forecasters anticipate that shipping in the 
Bering Strait region will increase substantially in the coming years. 
Higher levels of maritime traffic could lead to more accidents, ship 
strikes, pollution, noise, injuries, and deaths. Given the combination of 
increased shipping traffic, inadequate maritime infrastructure, and the 
threat of significant impacts to a vulnerable ecosystem, there is an urgent 
need to implement additional safety and environmental protection 
measures in the Bering Strait region. 
A.  Current Levels of Maritime Traffic in the Bering Strait Region 
Presently, the Bering Strait region experiences a low volume of 
commercial vessel traffic.73 Nevertheless, many types of ships still 
operate in the area. For example, each year during the open water period 
from July to October, roughly 150 large commercial vessels transit the 
Bering Strait.74 Of these, approximately twenty-five are bulk carriers 
making trips to the DeLong Mountain Terminal associated with the Red 
Dog mine located near the village of Kivalina, north of Cape Krusenstern 
National Monument.75 In addition to the vessels servicing the Red Dog 
Mine, Russian bulk carriers pass through the Bering Strait to support 
communities in the far northeast of the Russian Federation.76 These large 
vessels are joined by smaller fishing vessels and fuel barges serving 
coastal communities and area mines.77 A limited number of passenger 
vessels, likely associated with marine tourism, also travel through the 
Bering Strait region.78 Likewise, government and industry research and 
                                            
 73. See, e.g., AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 85 (maps showing relatively low 
maritime traffic in the Bering Strait region); id. at 89 (noting that in 2004, the total 
number of vessels operating in the entire circumpolar Arctic amounted to “less than 2 
percent of the world’s registered fleet of oceangoing vessels over 100 gross tonnage”). 
 74. Id. at 109.  
 75. Id. Some of these bulk carriers are quite large. For example, the Panamax- or 
Handymax-sized carriers can weigh up to 65,000 tons. Id. at 76. 
 76. Id. at 90. 
 77. Id. at 109.  
 78. Id. at 78. 
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survey vessels pass through the Bering Strait to pursue their scientific 
missions throughout the Arctic waters.79 
B.  Existing Infrastructure and Incident Response Capacity 
Maritime infrastructure supporting the Bering Strait region is limited. 
The United States side of the Bering Strait has three main ports: Nome, 
Kotzebue, and the DeLong Mountain Terminal.80 On the Russian side, 
the three largest ports are Provideniya, Anadyr, and Egvekinot.81 None of 
the Alaskan ports are deep-water ports.82 This means that loading and 
unloading operations must be done through lightering.83 For example, 
freight shipments to Kotzebue must be lightered roughly ten miles using 
smaller vessels with shallower drafts.84 Similarly, the DeLong Mountain 
Terminal requires lightering operations.85 For the most part, existing 
ports in the Bering Strait region are unable to accommodate deep-draft 
vessels in need of repair or refuge.86 
Navigational infrastructure in the Bering Strait region is similarly 
sparse. No formally established vessel routing measures exist in the area 
                                            
 79. See, e.g., STATOIL USA E&P INC., REQUEST BY STATOIL FOR AN INCIDENTAL 
HARASSMENT AUTHORIZATION TO ALLOW THE INCIDENTAL TAKE OF MARINE MAMMALS 
DURING A SHALLOW HAZARDS SURVEY IN THE CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA, 2011 5 (2011), 
available at www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/permits/statoil_iha_application2011.pdf 
(describing plan to mobilize seismic exploration vessels from Dutch Harbor to the 
Chukchi Sea); U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, REQUEST BY THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
FOR AN INCIDENTAL HARASSMENT AUTHORIZATION TO ALLOW THE INCIDENTAL TAKE OF 
MARINE MAMMALS DURING A MARINE SEISMIC SURVEY OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN, AUGUST – 
SEPTEMBER 2010 4 (May 2010), available at 
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/permits/usgs_arctic_iha_application2010.pdf (describing 
plans for the icebreaker Healy to approach seismic survey area from the Bering Strait).  
 80. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 108.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. Water depth in most ports in the Bering Strait region measures ten meters or 
less. Id. 
 83. “Lightering” (or “lightening”) refers to the process of transferring cargo from a 
larger, deep-draft vessel to smaller, shallower-draft vessels capable of entering shallow-
draft ports.  MARITIME ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., GLOSSARY OF SHIPPING TERMS 63 
(2008), available at www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Glossary_final.pdf. 
 84. N. ECONOMICS, ALASKA REGIONAL PORTS: PLANNING FOR ALASKA’S REGIONAL 
PORTS AND HARBORS FINAL REPORT 24 (2011), available at 
http://www.dot.state.ak.us/stwddes/desports/assets/pdf/regionalports_finalreport0111.pdf.  
 85. Id. at 35. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at ES-7 (“Most remote coastal Alaska communities lack the 
infrastructure and capabilities to respond to vessel disasters. The threat to life and 
property is most profound when vessels are unable to locate refuge from severe weather 
along the Alaska coastline.”). 
48 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1 
 
and there are few visual aids to navigation.87 For example, the U.S. Coast 
Guard maintains only three navigational aids in the Bering Strait along 
the north side of the Seward Peninsula, and there are no navigational aids 
north of Kotzebue Sound.88 No vessel traffic service or other traffic 
management system is in place and only limited shipboard automated 
identification system capabilities exist.89 The Bering Strait region lacks a 
shore-based VHF-FM communication service, and HF coverage in the 
region is poor.90 While the region has Global Positioning System-
Standard Positioning Service, its accuracy may be impaired because the 
system is not optimized for high latitudes.91 Currently, there is no 
Differential GPS coverage of the area.92  
Finally, incident response capabilities in the region are inadequate.93 
There is no permanent U.S. Coast Guard presence in the Bering Sea 
region. The nearest permanent Coast Guard facility is located on Kodiak 
Island in the North Pacific, a distance of over 1000 miles by sea.94 In the 
open water season of 2012, the U.S. Coast Guard plans to send a team to 
the Arctic to provide support for anticipated oil and gas exploration 
activities.95 However, as one report observed, “[e]ven if a U.S. Coast 
                                            
 87. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 109. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. See, e.g., ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
ALASKA NORTHERN WATERS TASK FORCE 15 (2012), available at 
http://housemajority.org/coms/anw/pdfs/27/NWTF_Full_Report_Color.pdf (“This 
remote, narrow, and hazardous international strait is located in an environmentally 
sensitive area with little to no search and rescue or maritime disaster-response capability 
within 800 miles.”) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. 
 94. See, e.g., NUKA RESEARCH AND PLANNING GROUP, OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND 
RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN: UNEXAMINED RISKS, UNACCEPTABLE 
CONSEQUENCES 23 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.pewenvironment.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/Oil%20Spill%20Prevention.pdf (noting nearest 
Coast Guard air station to the Arctic is in Kodiak); see also NAT’L OCEAN SERV., NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DISTANCES BETWEEN UNITED STATES PORTS, 34, 43 
(12th ed. 2012), available at http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/nsd/distances-
ports/distances.pdf (showing distance from Kodiak to Unimak Pass is 505 nautical miles 
and distance from Unimak Pass to Cape Prince of Wales is 702 nautical miles). 
 95. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ARCTIC SHIELD 2012 ALASKA 2-1-2-2 (July 2012), 
available at  www.uscg.mil/d17/docs/Final_EA_Version_rev_9_JUL_12.for_posting.pdf 
(describing plan to establish U.S. Coast Guard Forward Operating Location in Barrow, 
Alaska and conduct related operations).  
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Guard operating team were seasonally deployed to an Arctic coastal 
community, weather and distance to an incident site would remain huge 
challenges.”96 In addition to the lack of a year-round Coast Guard 
presence, the region has few salvage vessels capable of supporting search 
and rescue operations.97 To complicate matters, there is little data on 
weather and oceanographic conditions to support incident response 
operations.98 Presently, vessels in distress in the Bering Strait region 
must either rely on nearby vessels or local communities to render 
assistance or wait for help to arrive from outside the region.99 Poor 
weather and the distance to ports or other places of refuge present 
significant challenges to ships passing through the region.100 
C.  Increasing Maritime Traffic 
While vessel traffic in the Arctic is currently light, it is growing 
steadily. A 2012 report by the Alaska State Legislature noted that Arctic 
maritime traffic has increased from 6000 to 7000 vessels since 2006.101 
In the coming years, observers anticipate that maritime traffic in the 
Bering Strait region will grow even more. Increased vessel traffic in the 
Bering Strait region could result from growth in the use of trans-Arctic 
shipping routes, such as the Northwest Passage north of Canada or the 
Northern Sea Route north of Asia.102 Of the two routes, the Northern Sea 
Route is likely the more viable route, at least in the short term.103 The 
Russian Federation has developed and used portions of the route for 
                                            
 96. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 109.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 16 (noting growth in Arctic vessel traffic from 
2006 to present).  Prior to that study, a 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment noted 
that that marine transport in the Arctic to support exploration and extraction of natural 
resources is “increasing.” AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 90. 
 102. Cf. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 17 (showing Northern Sea Route and 
Northwest Passage). 
 103. TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 14 (comparing the two routes and noting that the 
Northern Sea Route “holds particular promise,” and is anticipated to “be the preferred 
Arctic sea lane in the near future”); AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 5  (concluding that 
“the Northwest Passage is not expected to become a viable trans-Arctic route through 
2020”); Northern Economics, Inc., Planning for Alaska’s Regional Ports and Harbors, 17 
(Jan. 2011) [hereinafter NORTHERN ECONOMICS, INC.], http://www.dot.state.ak.us/ 
stwddes/desports/assets/pdf/regionalports_finalreport0111.pdf (“Future shipping levels in 
the Northwest Passage are expected to be less than in the Northern Sea Route . . . ”).  
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many years.104 In the summer of 2009, with approval and assistance from 
the Russian Federation, two German-owned ships transited the Northern 
Sea Route from South Korea to Vladivostok and then on to the 
Netherlands.105 One Arctic shipping expert recognized the passage as the 
“first true commercial transit” of the Northern Sea Route from Asia to 
Europe.106 
Use of the Northern Sea Route could reduce significantly the 
distance, sailing time, and cost of Europe-to-Asia shipping when 
compared to the existing alternatives that run through the Panama or 
Suez canals.107 The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment observed that 
transportation of oil and gas via the Northern Sea Route is “technically 
and economically feasible,” and anticipated that by 2020, the volume of 
oil and gas transported via the Northern Sea Route could grow to as 
much as forty million tons per year.108 A recent economic analysis noted 
that the Northern Sea Route could be used to transport “oil and gas 
project modules” from their sites of fabrication to sites of operation on 
Alaska’s North Slope.109 Over the longer term, the analysis determined 
that trans-Arctic sea routes could be used to ship oil and gas from 
Alaska’s North Slope.110 A 2012 Alaska Legislature study noted the 
possibility of increasing trans-Arctic vessel traffic and observed that 
“transient traffic in the future, regardless of the route taken, must transit 
the Bering Strait.”111  
In addition to increased vessel traffic from trans-Arctic shipping, 
exploration and development of oil and gas leases in the Chukchi Sea 
and Beaufort Sea to the north and east could generate higher volumes of 
traffic through the Bering Strait.112 The 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment noted that “[w]ith diminishing summer sea ice in the Arctic 
Ocean, the Bering Strait region may experience increased destinational 
                                            
 104. See AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 44. 
 105. See, e.g., Andrew Kramer & Andrew Revkin, Arctic Shortcut Beckons Shippers as 
Ice Thaws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/ 
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REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/12/us-climate-
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 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., NORTHERN ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 104, at 17; AMSA 2009, supra 
note 12, at 44; TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 14.  
 108. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 5. 
 109. NORTHERN ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 103, at 33. 
 110. Id. 
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(showing Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage). 
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traffic to the oil and gas exploration areas in the Beaufort and Chukchi 
seas.”113 A 2011 economic analysis concluded that “ice-free conditions in 
the Arctic would facilitate marine traffic, thereby providing increased 
and more convenient support for North Slope oil and gas producers.”114 
The analysis explained that different phases of oil and gas operations 
would require different types of vessels:  
[d]uring the exploration phase of oil and gas development, a 
small fleet of seismic survey vessels and drill ships is typically 
involved. During the construction phase, a wide variety of vessel 
activity is involved, including project cargo and heavy lift ships 
delivering construction materials and components, ocean barges, 
other construction vessels, and supply vessels.115  
In fact, oil and gas operations in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas are 
already resulting in increased vessel traffic in the Bering Strait region.116 
Energy companies send seismic exploration vessels to Arctic waters to 
map subsurface geological features.117 In 2012, Shell plans to take a fleet 
of vessels through the Bering Strait to conduct exploratory drilling 
operations on leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.118 The U.S. Coast 
                                            
 113. Id. at 106; see also id. at 90 (“Increasing Arctic marine operations off Alaska in 
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas to support oil and gas exploration are envisioned for the 
next decade.”). 
 114. NORTHERN ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 103, at 33.  
 115. Id. 
 116. See generally LGL ALASKA RESEARCH ASSOC., INC., Request by Statoil for and 
Incidental Harassment Authorization to Allow the Incidental Take of Marine Mammals 
during Shallow Hazards Survey in the Chukchi Sea, Alaska, 2011, 5 (Apr. 2011), 
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/permits/statoil_iha_applicaiton2011.pdf (describing plan to 
mobilize seismic exploration vessels from Dutch Harbor to the Chukchi Sea); SHELL 
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., Application for Incidental Harassment Authorization 
for the Non-Lethal Taking of Whales and Seals in Conjunction with a Proposed Open 
Water Marine Survey Program in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, Alaska, During 2010, 
1-2 (Apr. 2010), www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/permits/shell_marine_survey_iha_ 
application.pdf (describing proposed seismic activities in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas). 
 117. See id.; see also SHELL EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., supra note 116, at 1-2. 
 118. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Chukchi Sea 
Planning Area, Shell Revised Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan Environmental Assessment, 
1-2 (Dec. 2011), www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/2011_1214_FINAL_2012 
ChukchiSeaEA.PDF (summarizing Shell’s 2012 exploration plans for the Chukchi Sea); 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Beaufort Sea Planning Area, 
2012 Shell Camden Bay Exploration Plan Environmental Assessment, 1-2 (Aug. 2011), 
www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Pl
ans/Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Beaufort_EP/EA_Shell2012CamdenBay.pdf 
(summarizing Shell’s 2012 exploration plans for the Beaufort Sea). 
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Guard also plans to send vessels to the Arctic to respond to potential 
search and rescue and security needs related to the planned exploratory 
drilling, to conduct outreach, and to test oil spill response systems.119 
The Bering Strait region could also experience increased vessel 
traffic from sources other than trans-Arctic shipping and oil and gas 
operations.120 Supply ships could increase the number of trips they 
make—or expand the season of service—to communities in western 
Alaska. For example, early in 2012, the city of Nome arranged for 
wintertime fuel delivery by a Russian tanker, accompanied by a U.S. 
Coast Guard icebreaker.121 The operation was the first of its kind in 
western Alaska,122 but it may not be the last. There could also be an 
expansion of maritime tourism in Arctic communities.123 Additionally, 
the Bering Strait region could experience increased traffic associated 
with the Red Dog Mine in northwest Alaska.124 
D.  Risks of Increased Vessel Traffic 
Increases in vessel traffic through the Bering Strait will also increase 
the potential for additional noise, air emissions, ship strikes, and 
discharges of hydrocarbons or other hazardous materials. All of these 
impacts could pose a threat to the region’s fish, birds, marine mammals, 
and to the people who depend on these biological resources to support 
their way of life.  
The Alaska State Legislature observed that: 
With increased shipping and marine traffic comes increased risk 
of vessel groundings, spills, collisions, pollutants, noise 
disturbances, and invasive species. This risk is particularly high 
                                            
 119. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT ARCTIC SHIELD 2012 ALASKA, 2.2-2.4 (July 2012), available at 
www.uscg.mil/d17/docs/Final_EA_Version_rev_9_JUL_12.for_posting.pdf.  
 120. See, e.g., Alaska Winter: Russian Tanker Reaches Ice-bound Nome, BBC NEWS, 
Jan. 13, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16555840; Alice Rogof, 
Melting Arctic: Think of the Bering Strait as the next Panama Canal, ALASKA DISPATCH, 
Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/melting-arctic-think-bering-strait-
next-panama-canal?page=0,0. 
 121. Id.  
 122. See, e.g., id. 
 123. Rogof, supra note 120 (“European cruise ships ply the famed Northwest Passage 
in summer and discharge passengers directly on our beaches—lightered by dinghies—in 
villages from Barrow to Nome. Even without docks, the tourists are arriving—sometimes 
virtually unannounced.”). 
 124. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 106. 
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due to the lack of detailed navigational charts, reliable weather 
forecasting, vessel traffic separation protocols, search and rescue 
infrastructure, and overall maritime domain awareness 
throughout the Arctic.125  
The threat of oil spills is of particular concern in icy waters like those of 
the Bering Strait region because sea ice can reduce significantly the 
effectiveness of mechanical recovery technologies.126  
The Bering Strait region is particularly vulnerable to the threats 
posed by increased vessel traffic because the region is home to high 
concentrations of wildlife.127 As noted above, wildlife congregates in the 
region to take advantage of the region’s high biological productivity, and 
is channeled through the Strait along the migration pathway between the 
Chukchi and Bering seas.128 As the ice-free season lengthens and vessel 
traffic grows, there is a greater potential for ships to strike bowhead 
whales as the whales migrate north and south through the Bering 
Strait.129 One assessment observed that “[p]otential conflicts between 
increased ship traffic and large marine pinnipeds and cetaceans in the 
[Bering Strait] region are associated with increases in ambient and 
underwater ship noise, ship strikes, entanglement in marine debris and 
pollution (including oil spills).”130 The area also hosts large seabird 
colonies that would be vulnerable to such impacts.131 If a marine disaster 
took place in the Bering Strait during a critical migration period, it could 
have serious adverse consequences on a large number of individual 
animals, in addition to affecting a number of species important to the 
region’s ecology.132 These negative impacts would spill over to adversely 
affect the people who live in Bering Strait communities, and who depend 
on the region’s biological resources to support their way of life.133  
Finally, it bears repeating that the impacts associated with increased 
maritime traffic in the Bering Strait region may pose an especially 
significant risk because the region is already experiencing stress from 
profound and rapid climate change, ocean acidification, and retreating 
                                            
 125. TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 14. 
 126. NUKA RESEARCH & PLANNING GROUP, supra note 94, at 73-75. 
 127. See id. at Part II.B. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See, e.g., Randall Reeves et al., Implications of Arctic Industrial Growth and 
Strategies to Mitigate Future Vessel and Fishing Gear Impacts on Bowhead Whales, 36 
MARINE POLICY 454, 458-459 (2012). 
 130. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 106. 
 131. Id. at 109. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 106-07. 
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seasonal sea ice.134 The impacts from increased vessel traffic—whether 
in the form of an acute, catastrophic disaster or the chronic, cumulative 
effects associated with increased shipping traffic over time—could add 
to, and act synergistically with, the effects of ongoing climate change 
and ocean acidification to negatively affect the marine ecosystem of the 
region. 
Given this context, there is an urgent need to put in place a more 
robust maritime safety infrastructure and to adopt and implement 
additional environmental protection measures in the Bering Strait region. 
The questions are: how can this best be accomplished, what 
organizations are best positioned to effect change, and what tools and 
instruments can they use? The remainder of this Article will address 
these questions. To provide context for that discussion, Part IV of this 
Article will briefly summarize the legal framework that governs 
maritime traffic, with a particular focus on the aspects of the law that 
may apply to the Bering Strait region.  
IV.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING MARITIME TRAFFIC 
Maritime traffic is governed by an overarching legal framework 
established by customary international law and the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).135 Among other things, 
this legal framework includes a series of maritime jurisdictional zones 
that balance the ability of coastal states to regulate vessel traffic and the 
ability of maritime powers to maintain navigational freedom.136 
However, the standard jurisdictional zones do not apply to all 
geographies; UNCLOS establishes a unique rule that applies to 
international straits, such as the Bering Strait.137 In addition, UNCLOS 
includes special provisions relating to ice-covered waters and 
ecologically important areas.138 
                                            
 134. See NUKA RESEARCH & PLANNING GROUP, supra note 94, at Part II.D. 
 135. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 136. See generally id. at Part III. 
 137. See generally id. at Part III, arts. 34–45.   
 138. Id. at art. 192 (obligation to preserve and protect), art. 211 (special areas) & art. 
234 (ice-covered areas).  
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A.  The Basic Maritime Jurisdictional Framework: Territorial Sea,  
Exclusive Economic Zone, and High Seas 
Customary international law, as reflected in UNCLOS,139 recognizes 
a number of maritime jurisdictional zones, ranging from internal waters 
to the high seas. Within each of these zones, coastal states may exercise 
varying degrees of authority over foreign-flagged vessels, and foreign-
flagged vessels have varying degrees of freedom of navigation.140 For 
purposes of this Article, the most important of these zones are the 
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the high seas.  
The territorial sea is the first maritime jurisdictional zone seaward of 
the coastline.141 A coastal state has the right to establish a territorial sea 
that extends from its coastline outward to a distance of twelve nautical 
miles.142 In general, a coastal state may exercise full sovereignty over its 
territorial sea and may adopt and enforce domestic legislation against 
both foreign citizens and its own citizens.143 That said, vessels from any 
country have the right to transit in “innocent passage” through a coastal 
state’s territorial sea.144 In broad terms, “innocent passage” refers to 
continuous and expeditious travel through the territorial sea that is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state, and 
that does not enter a coastal state’s internal waters.145 
Beyond the territorial sea lies the exclusive economic zone.146 A 
coastal state’s exclusive economic zone extends from the outer edge of 
its territorial sea seaward for a distance of no more than 200 nautical 
                                            
 139. As of this writing, the United States has not acceded to UNCLOS. However, “the 
United States adheres to almost all provisions of the Convention and considers most of its 
provisions to be a reflection of binding customary international law.” Jon M. Van Dyke, 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, OCEAN AND COASTAL L. & 
POL’Y 375, 381 (2008). See also 33 C.F.R. § 2.30 (2011) (defining “exclusive economic 
zone” with reference to “customary international law as reflected in Article 56 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”). 
 140. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 135, at arts. 3-5. 
 141. More precisely, the “coastline” refers to the baseline of the coastal state, which is 
generally the low-water line along the coast.  Id. at art. 5. 
 142. Id. at art. 3.  
 143. Id. at art. 2 (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory 
and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.”). See also Michael W. Reed, 
National and International Jurisdictions and Boundaries, OCEAN AND COASTAL L. & 
POL’Y 1, 8 (2008). 
 144. UNCLOS, supra note 135, at art. 17 (“[S]hips of all States, whether coastal or 
land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”). 
 145. Id. at arts. 18-19.  
 146. See id. at arts. 56-57.  
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miles from the coast.147 Within its exclusive economic zone, a coastal 
state has the sovereign right to explore, manage, conserve living and 
nonliving natural resources, and to exploit other economic activities 
including energy production.148 A coastal state also has jurisdiction with 
respect to the construction and use of artificial islands, marine research, 
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment within its 
exclusive economic zone.149 UNCLOS also imposes certain 
responsibilities on coastal states.150 For example, a coastal state must 
“ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the 
management of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is 
not endangered by over-exploitation.”151 
The high seas are those parts of the ocean that are not included in the 
exclusive economic zone, the territorial sea, or internal waters.152 
Pursuant to UNCLOS, “[n]o State may validly purport to subject any part 
of the high seas to its sovereignty.”153 Because of this, the high seas are 
open to all states, and include unrestricted freedom of navigation, 
freedom of overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, 
freedom of fishing, and freedom of scientific research, among other 
things.154  
B.  International Straits and Transit Passage 
The maritime jurisdictional framework described above does not 
apply to all geographic situations.155 In narrow international straits—like 
the Bering Strait156—special rules apply to ensure that non-coastal states 
have relatively unimpaired access through the passage.157 Where a strait 
is “used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
                                            
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at art. 56.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at art. 61. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at art. 86 (high seas also do not include archipelagic waters of an archipelagic 
state). 
 153. Id. at art. 89.  
 154. Id. at art. 87.  
 155. See generally id. at arts. 34-45. 
 156. It is generally acknowledged that the Bering Strait meets the UNCLOS definition 
of an international strait.  See, e.g., AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 106 (“The Bering 
Strait is a narrow international strait . . .”); Van Dyke, supra note 145, at 378 (referring to 
the Bering Strait as one of several “key” international straits). 
 157. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 135, at Part III, arts. 34-45. 
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exclusive economic zone,” vessels and aircraft have a right of “transit 
passage.”158 UNCLOS defines transit passage as “the exercise . . . of the 
freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous 
and expeditious transit of the strait.”159 In general, vessels in transit 
passage through an international strait must “refrain from any activities 
other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and 
expeditious transit.”160 The concept and principles of transit passage 
through international straits described in UNCLOS are generally 
recognized as customary international law.161 
In general, “[t]he laws and regulations that a coastal state may adopt 
with respect to transit passage [through an international strait] are more 
limited than those relating to innocent passage.”162 UNCLOS provides 
that coastal states “may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit 
passage through straits,” including laws or regulations relating to safety 
of navigation, vessel traffic, pollution control, fishing, customs, fiscal 
policy, immigration, and sanitary issues.163 However, those laws and 
regulations may “not discriminate in form or in fact among foreign 
ships” and cannot “have the practical effect of denying, hampering or 
impairing the right of transit passage.”164 Coastal states may also 
“designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes . . . where 
necessary to promote the safe passage of ships.”165 But in doing so, they 
must cooperate with other states that border the strait and refer their 
proposals to the “competent international organization.”166 For this and 
other similar purposes, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is 
                                            
 158. Id. at arts. 37-38. 
 159. Id. at art. 38.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 513 
cmt. j (1987).  Transit passage is similar to innocent passage, but is “free from many of 
the restrictions implied in innocent passage.”  Id. For example, a coastal state may 
temporarily suspend innocent passage through the territorial sea, but it may not suspend 
transit passage through an international strait. Id. Similarly, submarines must surface in 
innocent passage, but may remain submerged in transit passage. Id. 
 160. UNCLOS, supra note 135, at art. 39. 
 161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 513 cmt. j (1987). 
 162. Id.  
 163. UNCLOS, supra note 135, at art. 42. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at art. 41.  
 166. See id.; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 513 cmt. j 
(1987) (“[I]n international straits the designation of such lanes or schemes requires 
concurrent action by the strait state (or states) and the competent international 
organization.”).  
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recognized as the competent international organization.167 The IMO may 
adopt only those traffic separation schemes that are agreed upon with 
other states.168 
The legal regime that applies to the right of transit passage limits the 
ability of a coastal state to regulate and control vessel traffic that passes 
through an international strait bordering its coastline. With respect to the 
Bering Strait, this means that the United States has a limited ability to act 
unilaterally to impose additional regulations on vessel traffic. For 
example, while the United States and the Russian Federation could 
coordinate in an effort to designate vessel traffic lanes in the Bering 
Strait, the IMO would have to adopt any such lanes before they can be 
prescribed by the coastal states.169  
C.  Other Aspects of UNCLOS That May Apply to the Bering Strait 
Region 
In addition to describing the rules governing transit passage through 
international straits, UNCLOS contains a section on the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.170 Among other things, this 
section of the Convention imposes on states a general obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment171 and a responsibility to 
take measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine 
environment.172 Two other articles in this section may have particular 
relevance to the Bering Strait region: article 211, which allows states to 
identify and regulate “special areas,” and article 234, which relates to 
ice-covered areas. 
1.  UNCLOS Article 211 
In instances where a coastal state has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a particular area of its exclusive economic zone merits “special 
mandatory measures for the prevention of pollution from vessels,” 
UNCLOS article 211 provides that a coastal state may “adopt laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
                                            
 167. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 513 cmts. d & j 
(1987) (noting that the “competent international organization” is “principally the IMO”). 
 168. UNCLOS, supra note 135, at art. 41. 
 169. Id. at art. 41. 
 170. See e.g., id. at Part XII, arts. 192-237.  
 171. Id. at art. 192. 
 172. Id. at art. 194. 
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vessels . . . for special areas.”173 To adopt these laws and regulations, a 
coastal state must consult with other concerned states and submit its 
proposal to the IMO.174 If the IMO determines that the coastal state’s 
proposal satisfies the relevant requirements, the state may adopt its 
proposed laws and regulations.175 
Even if a coastal state can show that a particular area merits 
recognition and protection as a special area, there are limits on the state’s 
ability to impose regulations under article 211. For example, any 
additional regulations must be designed to address prevention of 
pollution from vessels.176 As a result, regulation under article 211 may 
not be the optimal way to address non-pollution impacts of shipping 
traffic, such as increased noise or the threat of ships striking large marine 
mammals. In addition, regulations imposed pursuant to article 211 “shall 
not require foreign vessels to observe design, construction, manning or 
equipment standards other than generally accepted international rules and 
standards.”177 This limitation likely precludes many significant 
protections. Moreover, article 211 only authorizes states to take 
regulatory action “in respect of their exclusive economic zones.”178 As a 
result, article 211 may have limited application in an international strait 
like the Bering Strait.  
2.  UNCLOS Article 234 
Article 234 provides that coastal states may adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations designed to prevent, reduce, “and 
control marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the 
limits of the exclusive economic zone.”179 It applies “where particularly 
severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for 
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, 
and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or 
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.”180 Laws or 
regulations enacted pursuant to article 234 must “have due regard to 
                                            
 173. Id. at art. 211(6)(a). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. (providing explicit authorization only for “laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels”). Regulations proposed 
under article 211 “may relate to discharges or navigational practices.” Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at art. 211(5). 
 179. Id. at art. 234.   
 180. Id.   
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navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment based on the best available scientific evidence.”181 
As is the case for article 211, the application of article 234 is limited. 
Article 234 only applies to areas that are ice-covered for “most of the 
year.”182 At present, the Bering Strait region may qualify as such an area, 
but as the climate changes and seasonal sea ice forms later in the 
season183 it is not at all certain that it will continue to qualify. In addition, 
article 234 is available only for areas within the limits of a state’s 
exclusive economic zone,184 and its application to vessels in transit 
passage through an international strait is not clear. 
V.  INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE  
Given the Bering Strait’s status as an international strait and the 
limitations on coastal states’ ability to restrict transit traffic in an 
international strait, the adoption of a strong system of safety, prevention, 
management, and mitigation measures in the region will require action 
from a variety of stakeholders. The following section examines the 
governmental agencies and international organizations that are best 
positioned to affect change in the Bering Strait region and the tools and 
instruments they can use to do so.  
A.  Coastal State Regulation:  Domestic Action and Bilateral Agreements 
Domestic and bilateral processes offer one path toward a 
strengthened safety and environmental protection regime in the Bering 
Strait region. Domestically, the U.S. Coast Guard has engaged in a Port 
Access Route Study designed to explore improvements to the regulation 
of maritime traffic in the Bering Strait region.185 Reaching beyond U.S. 
borders, the United States and the Russian Federation cooperate and have 
existing agreements on a variety of issues relating to the Bering Strait 
region.186 It may be possible to use that model to adopt and implement 
                                            
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See, e.g., AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 106 (noting that the Bering Strait region 
is projected to experience later freeze-up that will cause “a significant reduction” of sea 
ice in November and December in the future).  
 184. Id.  
 185. See Port Access Route Study: In the Bering Strait, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,568, 68,568–
70 (proposed Nov. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
 186. See e.g., Rick Janelle, Protection of the Marine Environment in the Bering and 
Chukchi Seas, THE COAST GUARD JOURNAL OF SAFETY AT SEA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
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additional safety and environmental protections. In general, the United 
States and the Russian Federation—whether acting unilaterally or 
jointly—have limited authority to impose binding regulations in an 
international strait. However, to the extent that the two Bering Strait 
coastal states recommend non-binding safety and protective measures, 
foreign-flagged vessels may elect to comply with those recommendations 
voluntarily. 
1.  U.S. Coast Guard Port Access Route Study Process in the Bering 
Strait 
The U.S. Coast Guard is currently conducting a Port Access Route 
Study in the Bering Strait in accordance with the Ports and Waterways 
Safety Act.187 Among other things, the study will evaluate “the need for 
modifications to current vessel routing measures and the need for 
creation of new vessel routing measures in the Bering Strait.”188 The 
Coast Guard intends for the study “to help reduce the risk of marine 
casualties and increase the efficiency of vessel traffic” in the Bering 
Strait area.189 The recommendations that result from the study could lead 
to domestic rulemaking or international agreement.190  
The Coast Guard intends to use the Bering Strait Port Access Route 
Study to “assess whether the creation of a vessel routing system is 
advisable to increase the predictability of vessel movements, which may 
decrease the potential for collisions, oil spills, and other events that could 
threaten the marine environment.”191 The Coast Guard anticipates that 
the study may result in a range of recommendations including: 
maintaining the status quo, establishing a traffic separation scheme, 
creating one or more precautionary areas, creating one or more inshore 
traffic zones, identifying deep-draft routes, establishing areas to be 
                                                                                                  
MARINE SAFETY COUNCIL  24–27 (2003) [hereinafter COAST GUARD JOURNAL] 
(discussing history of agreements and cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
Russian Federation); Robert E. Kramek & W. Russell Webster, Steaming with the 
Russians, 123 PROCEEDINGS: U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE (1997), available at 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1997-12/steaming-russians (describing 
expansion of relationship between United States and Russian Federation).  
 187. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (2002).  
 188. Port Access Route Study: In the Bering Strait, 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,568. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 68,570. 
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avoided, establishing or modifying anchorage grounds, establishing a 
regulated navigation area, or identifying other ships’ routing measures.192  
As explained below, many of these vessel routing measures are 
defined and recognized in international instruments193 and would likely 
require coordination with the Russian Federation and action by the IMO 
before being adopted and implemented in the Bering Strait.194 One of the 
identified measures—establishment of a regulated navigation area—is 
specific to waters subject to the United States’ jurisdiction.195 Coast 
Guard regulations define a regulated navigation area as a water area with 
a specific boundary for which the Coast Guard has issued regulations 
that specify times of vessel movement in certain areas; establish vessel 
size, speed, draft, or operating conditions; or restrict vessel operations in 
hazardous areas or under hazardous conditions.196 Because international 
law prevents a coastal state from enacting regulations that “have the 
practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit 
passage,”197 a United States regulated navigation area in the Bering Strait 
may have limited effect on foreign-flagged vessels.  
2.  Bilateral Agreements 
Beyond the U.S. Coast Guard’s domestic Port Access Route Study, 
there is also the opportunity for the two Bering Strait coastal states—the 
United States and the Russian Federation—to enter into a bilateral 
agreement aimed at improving maritime safety and environmental 
protection in the Bering Strait region.  
As noted above, the two nations already cooperate on a range of 
issues in the area. In 1972 the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the 
                                            
 192. Id. 
 193. See discussion infra Part V.C.1.a (describing ships’ routing measures recognized 
under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the IMO’s General 
Provisions on Ships’ Routeing). 
 194. See, e.g., Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic: Hearing before the H. Transp. & 
Infrastructure Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Maritime Transp., 112th Cong. (2011) 
[hereinafter Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic] (testimony of Admiral Robert Papp, 
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard) (noting that the Coast Guard will need to coordinate 
with the Russian Federation and other stakeholders before forwarding its analysis to the 
IMO for consideration). 
 195. See 33 C.F.R. § 165.9(b) (“[R]egulated navigation areas may be established in 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . .  including the territorial sea to a 
seaward limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline”). 
 196. Id. at §§ 165.10–165.11. 
 197. UNCLOS, supra note 135, at art. 42. 
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Field of Environmental Protection.198 In 1978 the two countries ratified a 
migratory bird treaty,199 and in 1989 they signed an agreement to 
cooperate on combating pollution in the Bering and Chukchi seas.200 In 
1995 the United States and the Russian Federal Border Service signed a 
memorandum of understanding that provided a framework for greater 
cooperation in areas such as search and rescue and maritime law 
enforcement.201 More recently, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Russian 
State Marine Pollution Control Salvage and Rescue Administration 
signed a memorandum of understanding and agreed to joint contingency 
planning relating to oil spill response.202 The Russian Federation and the 
United States have also cooperated in response to illegal fishing activities 
in the waters between the two nations.203 
The United States and the Russian Federation could use this history 
of collaboration as the basis for negotiating and implementing a bilateral 
agreement designed to improve shipping safety and environmental 
protection in the Bering Strait region. The bilateral approach has the 
advantage of relative simplicity. As an agreement between the two 
Bering Strait coastal states, it would not require the agreement of other 
Arctic countries or the blessing of the IMO.204 As such, however, it 
would only be binding on the United States and the Russian Federation 
and would not be enforceable against vessels of other nations that transit 
the Bering Strait.205 
                                            
 198. COAST GUARD JOURNAL, supra note 186, at 24-27. 
 199. Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and their 
Environment, U.S.-Rus., Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647; see also Fish and Wildlife 
Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-616, 92 Stat. 3110. 
 200. COAST GUARD JOURNAL, supra note 186, at 24-27. 
 201. Kramek & Webster, supra note 186.  
 202. Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic, supra note 194, at 6. 
 203. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-870, COAST GUARD EFFORTS TO 
IDENTIFY ARCTIC REQUIREMENTS ARE ONGOING, BUT MORE COMMUNICATION ABOUT 
AGENCY PLANNING EFFORTS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL, 15 (2010). 
 204. At the same time, the United States may be disinclined to enter into such an 
agreement for those very reasons. The United States has resisted attempts of coastal 
nations to extend their maritime jurisdiction into international waters. See, e.g., Michael 
Sternheim, Regulating the Northwest Passage, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 173, 178-82 (2011) 
(describing United States’ opposition to Canadian attempts to assert jurisdiction over the 
Northwest Passage). This has led one commenter to assert that “it is not likely that the 
United States would advocate a policy of establishing bilateral control regimes by states 
bordering waters that are considered international straits.” Id. at 204-05.  
 205. Cf. Sternheim, supra note 204, at 204 (noting, in context of a proposed United 
States-Canada bilateral agreement governing the Northwest Passage, that “any bilateral 
agreement would only bind the United States and Canada”).  
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3.  Setting the Stage for IMO Action and Voluntary Compliance 
As described above, implementation of a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and the Russian Federation or unilateral action 
by the United States—such as creation of a “regulated navigation area” 
pursuant to Coast Guard regulations—would have limited binding effect 
on the vessels of other nations. However, these types of actions could 
result in more enforceable regulatory measures in the future, perhaps 
carried out under the auspices of the IMO.206 
In addition, unilateral or bilateral adoption of non-binding 
regulations or recommendations could encourage voluntary compliance 
by foreign vessels passing through the Bering Strait. For example, a 
recent news media account of a meeting on Bering Strait shipping 
reported a shipping expert’s assertion that the vast majority of vessels 
comply with voluntary speed restrictions when others vessels are able to 
monitor their speeds using automated tracking technology.207 According 
to the report, the expert stated that “there are very few infractions 
because people know they are being watched, and do not want a 
reputation of non-compliance.”208 Similarly, a National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration report noted that most vessels voluntarily 
complied with a non-binding Area To Be Avoided—albeit one adopted 
by the IMO—off the coast of the Olympic Coast National Marine 
Sanctuary in Washington state.209 
B.  Arctic Council 
Another path toward strengthened safety and environmental 
protections in the Bering Strait region could run through the Arctic 
Council. The Arctic Council defines itself as “a high level 
intergovernmental forum [established] to provide a means for promoting 
                                            
 206. See, e.g., Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic, supra note 194, at 4 (testimony of 
Admiral Robert Papp, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, anticipating that the U.S. Port 
Access Route Study will lead to coordination with the Russian Federation and then 
consideration by the IMO). 
 207. Amelia Cooper, Organizations Prepare for Increased Arctic Shipping, NOME 
NUGGET, July 5, 2012, at 6, http://www.nomenugget.net/archives/2012/070512nn.pdf 
(quoting Coast Guard retiree Ed Page). 
 208. Id. (however, in the same article, Brad Hanson, a wildlife biologist, states that 
voluntary measures “really don’t work”). 
 209. GEORGE GALASSO, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN, MARINE SANCTUARY 
DIV., OLYMPIC COAST NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY AREA TO BE AVOIDED (ATBA) 
EDUCATION AND MONITORING PROGRAM, 1-4 (2000). 
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cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with 
the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants . . . .”210 The Council addresses a variety of Arctic issues, 
including those relating to sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.211 Arctic Council member states include Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, 
and the United States.212 A variety of indigenous organizations are 
permanent participants on the Council, including the Aleut International 
Association, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Arctic 
Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.213 
Through a series of working groups,214 the Arctic Council carries out 
programs and projects mandated by the Council’s Ministers.215 For 
example, in May 2011, the Arctic Council tasked its working groups 
with developing recommendations and best practices for the prevention 
of marine oil pollution in the Arctic.216 Past Arctic Council projects have 
usually resulted in non-binding guidelines and reports addressing 
science, ecology, and social and cultural issues.217 Some examples 
include the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,218 the Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment,219 the Arctic Council Offshore Oil and Gas 
                                            
 210. About the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanentparticipants (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
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(last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
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 216. Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, ARCTIC 
COUNCIL, www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/task-forces/280-oil-spill-task-
force (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
 217. J. Ashley Roach, International Law and the Arctic: A Guide to Understanding the 
Issues, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 301, 316-18 (2009). See also id. at 315-16 (describing Arctic 
Council projects as part of a “soft-law” regime applicable to the Arctic Ocean); Bonnie 
Malloy, On Thin Ice: How a Binding Treaty Regime Can Save the Arctic, 16 HASTINGS 
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 471, 486-87 (2010) (noting that the Arctic Council and its 
working groups “only create soft law”). 
 218. Susan Joy Hassal, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 219. AMSA 2009, supra note 12. 
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Guidelines,220 and Arctic Biodiversity Trends 2010: Selected Indicators 
of Change.221 More recently, however, the Arctic Council facilitated the 
adoption of an internationally binding search and rescue agreement for 
the Arctic.222 The 2011 Arctic search and rescue agreement “is the first 
legally binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council, and it also represents the first legally binding agreement on any 
topic ever negotiated among all the eight Arctic states.”223  
Among other things, the 2011 Arctic search and rescue agreement 
calls for coordination and communication among the parties, including 
the exchange of weather and ocean forecasts and warnings, joint 
exercises and training, shared support services, and use of ship reporting 
systems for search and rescue purposes.224 However, the agreement is not 
primarily designed to prevent shipping accidents, and it does not address 
critical gaps that exist in the Bering Strait region, such as lack of 
maritime infrastructure, vessel regulation, and environmental protection 
measures. Nonetheless, the Arctic search and rescue agreement should 
facilitate improved preparedness and response capacity in the event of an 
accident in the Bering region.  
Given the role the Arctic Council played in the development and 
adoption of the 2011 Arctic search and rescue agreement, the Council 
could play a similar role facilitating a multilateral agreement aimed at 
improving vessel safety, preventing maritime accidents, reducing the 
environmental impacts of vessel traffic, and bolstering environmental 
safeguards in the Arctic, particularly in the Bering Strait region.225 The 
                                            
 220. PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP, ARCTIC 
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Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 323, 327 (2008) 
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Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment226 could be 
viewed as a first step in this direction. The Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment includes a series of recommendations “to provide a guide for 
future action by the Arctic Council” and others.227 In fact, these 
recommendations—which concern ensuring safety, protecting Arctic 
people and the environment, and building the Arctic marine 
infrastructure228—have already served as a catalyst for action. In a status 
update released two years after publication of the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment, the Arctic Council concluded “that significant progress is 
being made on implementing many of the Assessment’s 
recommendations.”229 In particular, the update focused on IMO’s 
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters and the ongoing work to 
develop a legally binding Polar Code, in addition to the adoption of an 
Arctic search and rescue agreement.230 However, the status update also 
recognized that more work remained, including “further cooperation and 
increased efforts to improve Arctic maritime safety and protection of the 
Arctic marine environment.”231 
To the extent that the Arctic Council and others in the international 
community seek to improve maritime safety and protection of the marine 
environment in the Bering Strait region, the IMO will likely play a 
critical role. The following section explores some of the ways that the 
IMO and its instruments might be used to expand maritime safety and 
protection measures in the Bering Strait region.  
                                                                                                  
Russian Federation, Norway, Denmark, and Canada rejected this approach. In the 2008 
Ilulissat Declaration, these nations agreed that the existing legal framework “provides a 
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 226. AMSA 2009, supra note 12. 
 227. Id. at 6. 
 228. Id. at 6-7.  
 229. ARCTIC COUNCIL, STATUS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMSA 2009 REPORT 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2011), available at 
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cultural or ecological significance within the Arctic and then craft appropriate measures 
as necessary to safeguard such areas”). 
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C.  International Maritime Organization and its Instruments and 
Processes 
The IMO is a specialized agency within the United Nations 
responsible for the safety and security of shipping as well as the 
prevention of marine pollution by ships.232 The IMO facilitates most 
international maritime conventions and, through various codes and 
guidelines, helps implement international rules and standards governing 
vessel traffic.233 In this capacity, the IMO is well positioned to affect 
change in the Bering Strait region.  
A variety of IMO instruments, processes, and tools could be used to 
bolster safety and environmental protection measures in the Bering Strait 
region. First, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea234 
(SOLAS) allows the adoption and implementation of ships’ routing 
systems, ships’ reporting systems, vessel traffic services, and automatic 
identification systems. Second, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) provides for the 
designation of emission control areas and special areas.235  Third, the 
IMO is developing a mandatory Polar Code to address all aspects of 
polar shipping.236 Fourth, IMO Assembly Resolution 720(17) provides 
for the designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas that are subject to 
special regulation. The following sections explore these instruments and 
processes in more detail. 
1.  Ships’ Routing Measures, Ships’ Reporting Systems, Vessel Traffic 
Services, Long-Range Information and Tracking Systems, and 
Automatic Identification Systems 
SOLAS provides for four tools that may be particularly useful in 
improving vessel traffic safety and environmental protection in the 
Bering Strait region. First, SOLAS regulations give the IMO the 
                                            
 232. Introduction to IMO, IMO, http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
 233. AMSA 2009, supra note 12, at 50. 
 234. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 
1226 (as amended) [hereinafter SOLAS].  
 235. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended 
by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention of the Prevention of 
Pollution by Ships, 1973, Feb. 16, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
 236. Protecting the Polar Regions from Shipping, Protecting Ships in Polar Waters, 
IMO, www.imo.org/mediacentre/hottopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 
2012). 
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authority to adopt and implement ships’ routing systems that direct 
vessel traffic in certain areas.237 Second, SOLAS regulations give the 
IMO the authority to adopt ships’ reporting systems that facilitate 
communication between vessels and ships and shore-based facilities.238 
Third, SOLAS regulations call for member governments to implement 
vessel traffic services where appropriate.239 Vessel traffic systems are 
shore-based communications systems that range from providing simple 
information exchange with ships to providing more comprehensive 
management of vessel traffic in a particular area.240 Finally, SOLAS 
regulations now call for most large ships engaged in international 
voyages to be equipped with automatic identification systems and long-
range identification and tracking systems that can automatically transmit 
information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities.241 
a.  Ships’ Routing Measures 
Ships’ routing measures are used to reduce the risk of pollution or 
other damage to the marine environment caused by ships traveling, 
colliding, or grounding in or near environmentally sensitive areas.242 
IMO ships’ routing measures may be either recommended or mandatory 
for vessels243 and may apply to “all ships, certain categories of ships, or 
ships carrying certain cargoes.”244 Ships’ routing systems may “be 
established to improve safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of 
navigation, and/or increase the protection of the marine environment.”245 
Member governments may submit proposals for ships’ routing systems 
                                            
 237. SOLAS, supra note 234, reg. V/10.1. 
 238. Id. at reg. V/11.1. 
 239. Id. at reg. V/12.2.  
 240. See Vessel Traffic Services, IMO, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/ 
Navigation/Pages/VesselTrafficServices.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
 241. SOLAS, supra note 234, at regs. V/19.2.4 & V/19-1. 
 242. See Raul A. F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear Cargoes By Sea, 28 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 207, 229 (1997) (noting that ships’ routing measures are used to reduce the risk of 
casualties and prevent or reduce the risk of pollution or damage to the marine 
environment). 
 243. IMO, GUIDANCE NOTE ON THE PREPARATION OF PROPOSALS ON SHIPS’ ROUTEING 
SYSTEMS AND SHIP REPORTING SYSTEMS FOR SUBMISSION TO THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON 
SAFETY OF NAVIGATION, § 2.1 (2003) [hereinafter IMO GUIDANCE NOTE], available at 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Documents/1060.pdf.  
 244. SOLAS, supra note 234, at ch. V. See also IMO GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 243, 
at § 2.1. 
 245. IMO GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 243, at § 1.2. 
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and ship reporting systems to the IMO for consideration.246 IMO 
guidance and regulations provide that when “two or more Governments 
have a common interest in a particular area, they should formulate a joint 
proposal for the routing system with integrated measures and procedures 
for co-operation between the jurisdictions of the proposing 
Governments.”247  
Among other variations, ships’ routing measures may take the form 
of traffic separation schemes, areas to be avoided, and precautionary 
areas.248 A traffic separation scheme is “a routeing measure aimed at the 
separation of opposing streams of traffic by appropriate means and by 
the establishment of traffic lanes.”249 While the original purpose of traffic 
separation schemes was to prevent collisions and improve the safety of 
international shipping, they can also be used to direct “traffic flow 
around or at a safe distance from environmentally sensitive areas.”250 An 
area to be avoided is “an area within defined limits in which either 
navigation is particularly hazardous or it is exceptionally important to 
avoid casualties and which should be avoided by all ships, or by certain 
classes of ships.”251 In general, an area to be avoided cannot be adopted 
if it “would impede the passage of ships through an international 
strait.”252 A precautionary area is “an area within defined limits where 
ships must navigate with particular caution and within which the 
                                            
 246. Id. at § 1.1. 
 247. SOLAS, supra note 234, at ch. V & reg. V/10.5. See also IMO GUIDANCE NOTE, 
supra note 243, at § 3.3. 
 248. IMO, General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing, at § 2.1.1, (Nov. 20, 1985) 
[hereinafter IMO Provision on Shipping], as amended, http://www.imo.org/blast/ 
blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=22369&filename=A572(14).pdf.  
 249. Ships Routeing, IMO http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/ 
Pages/ShipsRouteing.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). See also 33 C.F.R. § 167.5(b) 
(defining traffic separation scheme as “a designated routing measure which is aimed at 
the separation of opposing streams of traffic by appropriate means and by the 
establishment of traffic lanes”).  
 250. IMO, Ships’ Routeing, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 827(19), Annex 3 § 1.1.6 (Nov. 23, 
1995) [hereinafter IMO Res. 827(19)], available at http://www.imo.org/blast/ 
blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=23907&filename=827-REV1%2819%29.pdf; see also IMO 
GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 243, at § 1.2 (providing that ships’ routing systems may be 
used to “increase the protection of the marine environment”). 
 251. Ships’ Routeing, supra note 249.  See also 33 C.F.R. § 167.5(a) (2011) (defining 
area to be avoided as “a routing measure comprising an area within defined limits in 
which either navigation is particularly hazardous or it is exceptionally important to avoid 
casualties and which should be avoided by all ships or certain classes of ships”). 
 252. See  IMO Res. 827(19), supra note 250, at § 3.3.7. 
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direction of flow of traffic may be recommended.”253 A precautionary 
area can serve to control traffic flow around an area that may pose 
hazards to shipping or may complement a designated area to be 
avoided.254  
b.  Ships’ Reporting Systems 
Ships’ reporting systems enable the communication and exchange of 
information between shore-based authorities and participating ships.255 
These systems should be considered when addressing “the improvement 
of the safety of life at sea, the safety and efficiency of navigation and/or 
to increase the protection of the marine environment.”256 When 
implemented, ships’ reporting systems should enable the exchange of 
basic information between ship and shore, including the ship’s name, call 
sign, and position.257 If necessary, the system may also call for the 
transmission of “the intended movement of the ship through the area, any 
operational defects or difficulties affecting the ship, and general 
categories of any hazardous cargoes on board.”258 In the event of an 
emergency or threat to the marine environment, the system may request 
that the ship provide the precise details of any hazardous cargoes as soon 
as possible.259 
Ships’ reporting systems may “be mandatory for use by all ships, or 
certain categories of ships, or ships carrying certain cargoes.”260 IMO 
may also review and recommend voluntary ship reporting systems; such 
systems will be recommended by IMO for voluntary use in international 
waters if the systems adhere as closely as possible to IMO regulations, 
guidance, and criteria.261 As is the case with ships’ routing measures, 
member governments may submit proposals for ships’ reporting systems 
                                            
 253. Ships’ Routeing, supra note 249.  See also 33 C.F.R. § 167.5(e) (defining 
precautionary area as “a routing measure comprising an area within defined limits where 
ships must navigate with particular caution and within which the direction of traffic flow 
may be recommended”). 
 254. See IMO Res. A. 827(19), supra note 250, at § 4.5.3 (containing diagrams 
illustrating the various uses of a Precautionary Area designation).  
 255. IMO, Maritime Safety Comm., Guidelines and Criteria for Ship Reporting 
Systems, IMO Assemb. Res. MSC.43(64) as amended § 2.2.1.2 (Dec. 9, 1994), available 
at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=15404&filename=43(64).pdf. 
 256. Id. at § 2.1. 
 257. IMO, GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 243, at § 6.2.2.  
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at § 5.1. 
 261. Id. at § 5.2. 
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to the IMO for consideration,262 and when “two or more governments 
have a common interest in a particular area, they should formulate a joint 
proposal for the ship reporting system with integrated measures and 
procedures for co-operation between the jurisdictions of the proposing 
Governments.”263 It is the responsibility of the proposing governments to 
plan and implement any proposed ships’ reporting systems.264 
c.  Vessel Traffic Services 
As noted above, vessel traffic services are shore-based 
communication systems that can provide simple information exchange 
with ships, or provide more comprehensive vessel management for a 
particular area.265 Broadly speaking, there are two types of vessel traffic 
services: port or harbor vessel traffic and coastal vessel traffic.266 The 
former “is mainly concerned with vessel traffic to and from a port or 
harbor,” and usually provides an assistance service or a traffic 
organization service.267 The latter “is mainly concerned with vessel 
traffic passing through the area” and is usually limited to providing an 
information service.268 SOLAS recognizes that vessel traffic services 
“contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation and 
protection of the marine environment, [and] adjacent shore areas . . . 
from possible adverse effects of maritime traffic.”269   
SOLAS calls on governments to “arrange for the establishment of 
[vessel traffic services] where, in their opinion, the volume of traffic or 
the degree of risk justifies such services.”270 However, vessel traffic 
services may only be made mandatory within the territorial seas of a 
coastal state, and they do not alter the legal regimes governing 
international straits.271 When planning and implementing vessel traffic 
services, governments should strive to follow relevant IMO guidelines.272 
                                            
 262. See, e.g., id. at § 1.1. 
 263. Id. at § 6.3. 
 264. Id. at § 6.1. 
 265. See IMO, Vessel Traffic Services, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/ 
Navigation/Pages/VesselTrafficServices.aspx (last visited July 22, 2012).  
 266. IMO, Guidelines For Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 857(20) § 
2.1.2 (Nov. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services], available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=22637&filename=A857(20).pdf.   
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. SOLAS, supra note 234, at reg. V/12.1. 
 270. Id. at reg. V/12.2. 
 271. Id. at reg. V/12.3 & 12.5. 
 272. Id. 
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IMO guidelines call for cooperation and agreement when two or more 
nations have a common interest in establishing a vessel traffic service for 
a given area.273 When two or more countries establish a vessel traffic 
service, “it should have uniform procedures and operations.”274 
d.  Automatic Identification Systems and Long-Range Identification 
and Tracking Systems 
SOLAS regulations now require certain large vessels engaged in 
international travel to be equipped with an automated identification 
system, and/or a long-range identification and tracking system.275 Both 
systems require participating vessels to transmit information about the 
vessel, but the systems operate in different ways. 
Automatic identification systems are VHF-based systems that are 
limited to line-of-sight transmission, but are able to transmit more data 
than long-range identification and tracking systems.276 Automatic 
identification system equipment “transmits information such as the name 
of the vessel, its position, speed, course, and destination to receivers 
within range of its broadcast, allowing these vessels to be tracked when 
they are operating in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports.”277 
Receivers for the automatic identification system may be located on 
vessels, land-based stations, or in other locations.278 
In contrast, long-range identification and tracking systems are 
satellite-based; unlike automatic identification systems, these systems 
                                            
 273. Guidelines For Vessel Traffic Services, supra  note 266, at § 2.2.1. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See SOLAS, supra note 234, at regs. V/19.2.4 & 19.1. United States law and 
regulations also require certain vessels to be equipped with automatic identification 
systems and long-range identification and tracking systems. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 70114 
(2002) (requiring certain vessels to carry automatic identification system equipment); 33 
C.F.R. § 164.46 (same); 33 C.F.R. § 169.210(a)-(c) (2008). 
 276. Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,310, 23,312 
(Apr. 29, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 166). In the future, commercially 
provided long-range automatic identification systems may be implemented; these systems 
would provide more information than the long-range identification and tracking system. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-337, MARITIME SECURITY: VESSEL 
TRACKING SYSTEMS PROVIDE KEY INFORMATION, BUT THE NEED FOR DUPLICATE DATA 
SHOULD BE REVIEWED, 8 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter GAO VESSEL TRACKING SYSTEMS]. 
Commercially provided long-range automatic identification systems may be able to track 
vessels up to 2,000 nautical miles at sea, but the Coast Guard does not expect 
commercially provided long-range AIS to be fully operational until 2014. Id. 
 277. GAO VESSEL TRACKING SYSTEMS, supra note 276, at 2. 
 278. Id. 
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enable observers to identify and track vessels over a broader geographic 
area.279 Long-range identification and tracking systems provide for 
transmission of vessel identification and position to a national data 
center, which can then share that information with an international data 
exchange.280 For example, in general, U.S. flag ships must transmit 
periodic long-range identification and tracking position reports to the 
United States data center when they are engaged in an international 
voyage, while foreign flag ships on international voyages must transmit 
long-range identification and tracking position reports to a U.S. data 
center after they announce their intention to enter a United States port, or 
when the ship is within 1,000 nautical miles of the baseline of the United 
States.281 
By allowing vessels and on-shore observers to track and 
communicate with ships, long-range identification and tracking systems 
and automatic identification systems help avoid collisions, maintain safe 
distance from maritime hazards, locate vessels in distress, and assist in 
search and rescue efforts. Moreover, because vessels equipped with these 
systems know they are visible to others, the systems may encourage safer 
maritime practices and compliance with both mandatory and voluntary 
regulatory measures. As noted above, one expert has asserted that vessels 
using tracking systems are likely to adhere to even voluntary restrictions 
because their operators “do not want a reputation of non-compliance.” 282 
2.  Special Areas and Emission Control Areas 
In addition to the vessel routing, tracking, and monitoring of systems 
and procedures contemplated in the SOLAS convention, MARPOL 
offers other types of tools designed to protect the maritime environment 
and reduce pollution.283 MARPOL “addresses pollution from ships by 
oil; by noxious liquid substances carried in bulk; harmful substances 
carried by sea in packaged form; sewage, garbage; and the prevention of 
                                            
 279. Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships, supra note 276, at 23,312. 
 280. GAO VESSEL TRACKING SYSTEMS, supra note 276, at 17. 
 281. 33 C.F.R. § 169.210(a)-(c), supra note 275. See also GAO VESSEL TRACKING 
SYSTEMS, supra  note 276, at 5-6. 
 282. Cooper, supra note 207, at 1 & 6.  
 283. See generally MARPOL, supra note 235. See also IMO, Int’l Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/ 
listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-prevention-of-pollution-from-
ships-%28marpol%29.aspx [hereinafter IMO, MARPOL]. 
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air pollution from ships.”284 Two MARPOL tools that may be 
particularly relevant are the designation of special areas and emission 
control areas. 
a.  Special Areas Under MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV, and V 
MARPOL provides for the designation of specific areas of the ocean 
as “special areas.”285 Special areas are areas where, “for technical reasons 
relating to their oceanographical and ecological condition and to their sea 
traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of 
sea pollution is required.”286 A special area “may encompass the 
maritime zones of several States, or even an entire enclosed or semi-
enclosed area.”287 Under MARPOL, special areas are provided with a 
higher level of protection than other areas of the sea.”288  
Special area designation is available under MARPOL Annex I for 
oil, Annex II for noxious liquid substances in bulk, Annex IV for 
sewage, and Annex V for garbage.289 Special area designation is based 
on three separate categories: oceanographic conditions, ecological 
conditions, and vessel traffic characteristics.290 To qualify for a special 
area designation based on oceanographic conditions, a location must 
experience concentration or retention of harmful substances or sediments 
due to its circulation patterns, temperature, salinity stratification, low 
                                            
 284. IMO, Pollution Prevention, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/ 
PollutionPrevention/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited July 22, 2012).   
 285. See MARPOL, supra note 235, at Annexes I, II, IV & V. See also IMO, 
MARPOL,  supra note 283.  
 286. IMO, Special Areas Under MARPOL, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/ 
Environment/PollutionPrevention/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pages/Default.aspx 
[hereinafter Special Areas Under MARPOL] (last visited July 22, 2012). See also IMO, 
Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas Under MARPOL 73/78 and Guidelines 
for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, IMO Assemb. 
Res. A. 927(22) § 2.1 (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter IMO Res. A. 927(22)], available at  
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=10469&filename=927.pdf.    
 287. IMO Res. A. 927(22), supra note 286, at § 2.2.  
 288. Special Areas Under MARPOL, supra note 286. See also IMO Res. A. 927(22), 
supra note 286, at § 2.1.   
 289. IMO Res. A. 927(22), supra note 286, at § 2.1; see also Special Areas Under 
MARPOL, supra note 286 (noting the existence of a Baltic Sea special area under Annex 
IV). 
 290. IMO Res. A. 927(22), supra note 286, at § 2.3. IMO guidance suggests that 
special area proposals for special area designation contain information on each category 
of criteria—oceanographic conditions, ecological conditions, and vessel traffic 
characteristics.  Id. 
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flushing rates, extreme ice state, or adverse winds.291 Qualifying 
ecological conditions include: depleted, threatened, or endangered 
marine species; areas of high natural productivity; spawning, breeding, 
and nursery areas; areas representing migratory routes for seabirds and 
marine mammals; rare or fragile ecosystems; or critical habitats and/or 
areas of critical importance for the support of large marine ecosystems.292 
To qualify as a special area based on vessel traffic characteristics, the 
area must experience traffic such that conformance with the usual 
requirements of MARPOL would be insufficient to protect the area from 
pollution.293 Other factors may influence the consideration of a particular 
location as a special area as well.294 
To obtain a special area designation, a nation must submit a proposal 
to the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee.295 The 
proposal must define the exact location of the area being proposed, 
describe the area’s characteristics, set forth the reasons for its 
designation, and explain how the area fulfills the criteria for the 
designation of special areas.296 If IMO designates the proposal as a 
special area, the designation will become effective only when there are 
adequate reception facilities in the area to receive the harmful substance 
from affected ships.297 
b.  Emissions Control Areas Under MARPOL Annex VI 
The IMO recognizes that nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, and 
particulate matter from vessels “contribute to ambient concentrations of 
air pollution in cities and coastal areas around the world,” and that 
“[a]dverse public health and environmental effects associated with air 
pollution include premature mortality, cardiopulmonary disease, lung 
cancer, chronic respiratory ailments, acidification and eutrophication.”298 
To that end, regulations in MARPOL Annex VI provide for the 
                                            
 291. Id. at § 2.4. 
 292. Id. at § 2.5.  
 293. Id. at § 2.6.  
 294. Id. at §§ 2.3, 2.8-2.10. 
 295. Id. at § 3.1. 
 296. Id. at §§ 3.2-3.3.  
 297. IMO Res. A. 927(22), supra note 286, at § 2.7.  
 298. IMO, Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Revised MARPOL Annex VI, 
International Convention for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships [hereinafter 
Revised MARPOL Annex VI], MEPC Res. 176(58), at 39, MEpC 58/23/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 
2008) available at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=23760& 
filename=176(58).pdf.  
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establishment of emission control areas, which are defined as “area[s] 
where the adoption of special mandatory measures for emissions from 
ships is required to prevent, reduce and control air pollution from 
[nitrogen oxides] or [sulphur oxides] and particulate matter or all three 
types of emissions and their attendant adverse impacts on human health 
and the environment.”299 Emission control areas are governed by stricter 
emissions limits than other areas of the sea.300 
Parties to MARPOL may submit to the IMO a proposal for the 
designation of an emission control area for nitrogen oxides, sulphur 
oxides, or particulate matter (or all three).301 IMO guidance requires that 
when two or more nations have a common interest in an area, the nations 
should work together to submit a coordinated proposal.302 Proposals must 
include a description of the proposed area, the type of emission(s) 
proposed for control, an explanation of the human populations and 
environmental areas under threat from the emissions, an assessment that 
vessels in the area are contributing to ambient levels of emissions or 
adverse environmental impacts, information on meteorological 
conditions, the nature of vessel traffic, a description of land-based 
emission control measures, and other information.303  
In 2010, the IMO adopted the North American emission control area 
for nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, and particulate matter.304 The 
emission control area forms a band stretching outward from the North 
American shoreline from the northern portion of Labrador to the 
southern portion of Texas on the east and Gulf of Mexico coasts, and 
throughout the west coast of North America from southern California to 
the northern portion of southeast Alaska.305 The emission control area 
also includes an area encircling the Hawaiian Islands.306 In 2011, the 
                                            
 299. Id. at 4. 
 300. See, e.g., id. at 39 (establishing emissions limitations for nitrogen oxides in 
emission control areas); id. at 19-20 (establishing emissions limitations for sulphur oxides 
and particulate matter in emissions control areas).  
 301. Id. at 39. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 39-40. 
 304. Special Areas under MARPOL, supra note 286. The North American emission 
control area came into effect on August 1, 2012. See IMO, North American Emission 
Control Area Comes Into Effect on 1 August 2012, available at 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/28-eca.aspx.  
 305. See, e.g., IMO, Information on North American Emission Control Area Under 
MARPOL Annex VI [hereinafter MARPOL Annex VI], MEPC 1/Circ.723 (May 13, 2010) 
available at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29099& 
filename=723.pdf.  
 306. See, e.g., id. at 3.  
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IMO also adopted the United States Caribbean Sea emission control area 
for nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, and particulate matter.307 Arctic 
waters, including the Bering Strait region, are not included in the existing 
North American emission control area.  
3.  Mandatory Polar Code 
Although SOLAS and MARPOL provide mechanisms to address the 
safety and environmental issues in Arctic waters, they are not 
specifically tailored to the Arctic. However, the IMO is currently 
facilitating the development of a mandatory Polar Code that targets 
shipping in polar waters.308  
As noted above, the IMO has already adopted non-mandatory 2010 
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.309 These guidelines 
cover topics such as ship construction, equipment, and operation, as well 
as environmental protection and damage control.310 The Polar Code will 
follow the adoption of the 2010 Guidelines, and is intended to “cover the 
full range of design, construction, equipment, operational, training, 
search and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships 
operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles.”311 The 
Polar Code will “address the risks that are specific to operations in polar 
waters, taking into account the extreme environmental conditions and the 
remoteness of operation.”312 The working group developing the Polar 
Code—working under the auspices of the IMO’s ship design and 
equipment subcommittee—agreed that it should “apply in polar waters 
only,” that “ships not trading in polar regions would not need to comply 
with its requirements,” and that “the Code should be made mandatory 
under SOLAS and/or MARPOL.”313 
                                            
 307. Special Areas under MARPOL, supra note 286. The United States Caribbean Sea 
emission control area is expected to take effect on January 1, 2014. Id. 
 308. IMO, Subcomm. on Ship Design and Equip., 53rd session, Feb. 2010, 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/DE/Pages/DE-53rd-Session.aspx 
(last visited July 22, 2012) (noting that a correspondence group is in the process of 
drafting a mandatory Polar Code). 
 309. IMO, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Assemb. Res. 
A.1024(26), at 4 (Jan. 18, 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/blast/ 
blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29985&filename=A1024(26).pdf.  
 310. Id. at 12-33.  
 311. Subcomm. on Ship Design and Equip., 53rd session, supra note 308, at 2. 
 312. IMO, Subcomm. on Ship Design and Equip., 54th Session, Oct. 2010, available at 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/DE/Pages/DE-54th-Session.aspx 
(last visited July 22, 2012).  
 313. Subcomm. on Ship Design and Equip., 53rd session, supra note 308. 
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As of the end of February 2012, the Polar Code working group had 
made progress developing the “technical parts” of the Code.314 The ship 
design and equipment subcommittee agreed to forward relevant sections 
of the draft code to the other appropriate IMO subcommittees, including 
the subcommittees on radio communications, search and rescue, fire 
protection, safety of navigation, stability, load lines, fishing vessel safety, 
and training and watch-keeping.315 However, the working group was 
divided on how to proceed with respect to the “environmental aspects” of 
the Code.316 Some in the working group felt that the environmental 
protection provisions should be incorporated as part of the Polar Code, 
while others felt that they should be adopted as amendments to 
MARPOL and other IMO instruments.317 As of this writing, the ship 
design and equipment subcommittee had forwarded the issue for 
consideration by the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee.318 Regardless of how it decides to handle the environmental 
aspects, it is likely that the IMO will adopt a mandatory Polar Code, and 
that portions of the Code or related provisions will have the effect of 
improving safety and environmental protection measures in the Bering 
Strait region.  
4.  Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas 
One more IMO mechanism may have particular relevance to efforts 
to improve vessel safety, prevent maritime accidents, protect the 
environment, and mitigate the impacts associated with increased ship 
traffic: designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs). Since 
1991, IMO guidelines have allowed the designation of PSSAs.319 The 
IMO defines a PSSA as “an area that needs special protection through 
action by IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, 
                                            
 314. IMO, Subcomm. on Ship Design and Equip., 56th session, Feb. 2012, available at 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/DE/Pages/DE-56th-session.aspx 
(last visited July 22, 2012).  
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.   
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 319. See Helene Lefebvre-Chalain, Fifteen Years of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: A 
Concept in Development, 13 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 47 (2007) (noting that IMO first 
passed the Assembly Resolution that provided for PSSAs in 1991).  
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socio-economic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be 
vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities.”320 
At or before the time it is designated, a PSSA must be accompanied 
by an “associated protective measure.”321 An associated protective 
measure is a protective action that is, or will be, approved or adopted by 
IMO. This could include the designation or adoption of a special area or 
an emissions control area, special discharge restrictions, ships’ routing 
and reporting systems, or any other protective measure designed to 
protect sea areas against environmental damage from ships (that also 
have an identified legal basis).322 The IMO also suggests that PSSAs 
could be listed on the World Heritage List, declared a Biological 
Reserve, or included on other lists of ecologically important areas.323  
Only the IMO can designate PSSAs.324 To create a PSSA, a nation 
must submit an application to the IMO to propose an area for PSSA 
designation and adopt associated protective measures.325 If multiple 
countries have a common interest in an area, they should submit a 
coordinated proposal to IMO for consideration.326 IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee will analyze the application, hear 
presentations from the nominating government(s), and receive reports 
from IMO technical groups; after doing so, it may designate the area “in 
principle”327 and inform the appropriate IMO committees and 
subcommittees.328 The Marine Environment Protection Committee 
makes the final PSSA designation only after the appropriate committees 
and subcommittees—or the IMO Assembly—approve the associated 
protective measures.329 
To qualify for designation as a PSSA, IMO guidelines require an 
area to be vulnerable to damage from international shipping activities, 
and to have attributes that fall within at least one of three broad, inclusive 
categories: ecological criteria; social, cultural, and economic criteria; and 
                                            
 320. IMO, Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Areas, IMO Assemb. Res. A.982(24), at 3 (Dec. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=14373&filename=982.pdf.  
 321. Id. at 9-11.  
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scientific and educational criteria.330 Ecological criteria include factors 
such as the uniqueness or rarity of the area, the presence of critical 
habitat in the area, the degree to which the area is representative of a 
certain habitat type, the area’s diversity and productivity, the presence of 
spawning or breeding grounds or migratory routes in the area, the 
naturalness, integrity, or fragility of the area, and other factors.331 Social, 
cultural, and economic criteria include the extent to which people depend 
on the ecological health of the area for social or economic purposes, the 
extent to which the area is important for the support of traditional 
subsistence or food production activities, or the presence of historical or 
archaeological sites.332 Finally, scientific and educational criteria include 
factors such as whether an area is of particular scientific interest, whether 
it can provide a baseline for monitoring studies, or whether the area 
provides an outstanding opportunity for education.333 
In addition, an application for designation of a PSSA must describe 
the area’s vulnerability to damage from international shipping 
activities.334 IMO guidelines require consideration of vessel traffic 
characteristics, such as the type of maritime activities in the area, the 
types of vessels that use the area, the characteristics of the vessel traffic, 
and the extent to which vessels carry harmful substances.335 An 
application must also consider the area’s natural characteristics, such as 
water conditions, weather conditions, and the presence of potential 
hazards like sea ice, tidal streams, or ocean currents.336 Proposals for 
PSSA designation can also consider other factors, including any history 
of accidents or stresses from other environmental sources.337 
D.  Application of Tools to the Bering Strait Region 
The foregoing section described a variety of tools—ranging from 
domestic regulation to bilateral agreements to international instruments 
and processes—which might be employed to improve safety, safeguard 
against accidents, and mitigate and protect against the potential impacts 
of vessel traffic. Many of these tools could have meaningful application 
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in the Bering Strait region and should be pursued by the relevant 
authorities. 
The U.S. Coast Guard’s Port Access Route Study in the Bering Strait 
is an important first step. It could lead to the implementation of domestic 
safety and environmental protection actions, and it could set the stage for 
cooperation with the Russian Federation and eventual action at the IMO.  
The Port Access Route Study should recommend implementation of 
a comprehensive vessel routing system to regulate maritime traffic in the 
Bering Strait region. The system should include a traffic separation 
scheme to prevent collisions and guide ships along safe fairways that 
avoid environmentally sensitive areas and minimize the area where 
bowhead whales and other marine mammals are exposed to the danger of 
ship strikes. Such a system would not be unique. For instance, Panama 
has proposed vessel traffic lanes to guide ships in and out of the Panama 
Canal in a way that will reduce the area of the ocean where whales will 
be exposed to ship strikes.338 Similarly, in the San Francisco Bay region, 
United States government agencies, shipping industry representatives, 
and whale researchers have cooperated to recommend measures that 
would confine vessel traffic to shipping lanes that extend further out to 
sea in an effort to better protect whale feeding grounds at the edge of the 
continental shelf.339 In the Bering Strait region, a vessel routing system 
would have to be designed so as to allow vessels the flexibility to 
navigate safely in response to changing sea and ice conditions. Such a 
system would also require IMO approval.  
The Port Access Route Study should recommend that areas in the 
Bering Strait region that are important for local subsistence hunting, or 
that have particular ecological importance, be designated as areas to be 
avoided or precautionary areas to minimize the potential for interference 
and impacts from vessel traffic. In many places in the Bering Strait 
region, designation of these areas would require IMO authorization. 
However, in areas of the Bering Strait region where the United States has 
jurisdiction and that are not subject to transit passage, the Coast Guard 
should consider creating regulated navigation areas to protect important 
coastal habitats. The Coast Guard has already designated a regulated 
navigation area in Alaska’s Prince William Sound.340 Where appropriate, 
                                            
 338. Richard Black, Whales to Gain Panama Canal Traffic Protection, BBC NEWS, 
July 6, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
18720380?print=true.  
 339. Feds to Reroute SF Bay Ships Traffic After Spike in Whale-ship Collisions, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (July 15, 2012) [hereinafter Feds to Reroute]. 
 340. 33 C.F.R. § 165.1704 (2012).  
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it could implement a similar system for important ecological areas in the 
Bering Strait region. 
Further, the Coast Guard’s Port Access Route Study should also 
recommend an integrated vessel traffic service to improve vessel 
monitoring, communication, and emergency response capabilities in the 
region. Such a service would not be the first in Alaska: there is already a 
vessel traffic service in effect for portions of Alaska’s Prince William 
Sound, including Valdez Arm, Valdez Narrows, and Port Valdez.341 
However, a new vessel traffic service in the Bering Strait region should 
be operated on a cooperative basis with the Russian Federation. The 
cooperative vessel traffic service for the Juan de Fuca region, which is 
operated jointly by the United States and Canada, could be a model for 
the Bering Strait region.342  
The Alaska Marine Exchange now lists at least seven automatic 
identification system receivers in the Bering Strait region as of April 
2012.343 As this system grows, it will fill in gaps in maritime 
infrastructure and become the foundation for a comprehensive vessel 
traffic service that will help foster improved tracking, search and rescue, 
and communication in the area. This kind of system could also be used to 
implement real-time monitoring of marine mammals, enabling vessels to 
report sightings of marine mammals—such as bowhead whales—so that 
other vessels in the area can avoid the animals or reduce speed to lower 
the risk of a collision.344 
Because ice and vessel traffic conditions in the Bering Strait region 
are anticipated to change, which in turn creates a higher risk of collision 
between marine mammals and vessels, the Coast Guard should consider 
recommending implementation of a reporting system in the region. 
Under this type of reporting system, ships will be required to identify 
themselves, and to communicate to others their direction, speed, and 
                                            
 341. 33 C.F.R. § 161.60 (2012).  
 342. 33 C.F.R. § 161.55 (2012). See also U.S. Coast Guard, USCG: Purpose and 
Objective—Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service—13th Coast Guard District—Guardians 
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intended route of travel as they enter the reporting area,345 thereby 
providing shore-based authorities the opportunity to warn them and 
others of known marine mammals or other hazards in their vicinity.346 
Given the Bering Strait’s status as an international strait, it is 
unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to impose unilaterally all the 
recommendations that stem from its Port Access Route Study. However, 
recommendations that flow from the study can set the stage for 
coordination and cooperation with the Russian Federation and 
implementation of safety and environmental protection measures through 
future IMO action. Because the IMO encourages submission of joint 
proposals from interested nations, the United States should cooperate 
with the Russian Federation in developing recommendations regarding 
ships’ routing systems, reporting systems, and vessel traffic services. To 
the extent that the United States or the Russian Federation require or 
recommend that their vessels conform to certain safety or environmental 
protection measures in the Bering Strait region, other countries’ vessels 
may be encouraged to voluntarily follow suit.   
At the multinational level, the Arctic Council should continue to 
press for implementation of the recommendations contained in the 2009 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. More broadly, it can play an 
important role in fostering cooperation and consensus among Arctic 
nations in support of actions designed to improve vessel safety, prevent 
maritime accidents, reduce the environmental impacts of increased vessel 
traffic, and bolster environmental safeguards in the Arctic, specifically in 
the Bering Strait region. 
The IMO is uniquely positioned to implement many safety, 
prevention, mitigation, and environmental protection measures, whether 
binding or recommended, in the Bering Strait region. The IMO should 
continue its development of a comprehensive and mandatory Polar Code. 
In so doing, it should ensure that environmental regulations are built into 
the Code so that they are on equal footing with the more technical 
aspects of the Code. Pursuant to SOLAS, the international community 
should use the IMO processes to adopt comprehensive ships’ routing 
systems, ships’ reporting systems, and vessel traffic services for the 
Bering Strait region. Implementation of these systems will help fill 
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significant gaps in the maritime infrastructure of the Bering Strait region. 
Likewise, to reduce the potential threat of pollution from increasing 
vessel traffic in the Bering Strait region, the United States should 
coordinate with the Russian Federation to promote the region as a 
“special area” in order to obtain protection under various MARPOL 
Annexes. The United States should also consider working with the 
Russian Federation to propose an expansion of the existing North 
American emission control area so that it covers Arctic waters including 
the Bering Strait region.  
Finally, the United States should consider coordinating with the 
Russian Federation and others in the international community to propose 
the Bering Strait region as a PSSA, incorporating many of the above-
mentioned safety and environmental protection measures as associated 
protective measures. Although there currently are no PSSAs in Arctic 
waters,347 the Bering Strait region is a prime candidate for such 
designation. Given the characteristics and attributes of the Bering Strait 
region—including its productivity, habitat, vulnerability in the face of 
rapid environmental change, and importance as a migratory pathway and 
to subsistence communities—the region should easily satisfy the required 
ecological, social, cultural, economic, scientific, and educational criteria. 
The threat of increased vessel traffic in an ecologically important area, 
coupled with the objective hazards of the Bering Strait’s geography, 
powerful storms, and seasonal sea ice coverage, demonstrate that the area 
is vulnerable to damage arising from increased international shipping 
activities. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Bering Strait region is a highly productive marine environment 
with large concentrations of wildlife, including a wide variety of marine 
mammals, birds, and fish. It is also home to human residents who rely on 
an intact ocean ecosystem to support a way of life that is thousands of 
years old. The marine ecosystem of the Bering Strait is experiencing 
significant change as the climate warms, seasonal sea ice is reduced in 
temporal and geographic extent, and acidification begins to affect the 
surface waters of the ocean.  
As a remote area without well-developed maritime infrastructure, the 
Bering Strait lacks strong environmental protections. While extensive 
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seasonal sea ice protected the area from high levels of commercial and 
industrial use in the past, the Bering Strait region is experiencing 
increased vessel traffic as sea ice retreats. Observers anticipate additional 
growth as commercial and industrial use expands. This combination—a 
vulnerable marine environment and increasing commercial and industrial 
use—calls for the adoption and implementation of increased safety and 
environmental protection and regulation in the region.  
The Bering Strait’s status as an international strait restricts the 
United States’ ability to act on its own to impose binding regulations on 
foreign-flagged vessels in some parts of the Bering Strait region. 
However, the United States is able to impose restrictions in areas of its 
territorial sea that are not subject to transit passage. The United States 
can also coordinate with the Russian Federation and other nations to 
initiate proposals in the international community that can set the stage for 
future safety, prevention, mitigation, and environmental protection 
actions by the IMO. In the meantime, to the extent that the United States 
implements measures designed to regulate vessel traffic or protect the 
marine environment in the Bering Strait region—either on its own or in 
concert with the Russian Federation—it may encourage voluntary 
compliance with those measures by foreign-flagged vessels even in the 
absence of IMO action. 
The United States Coast Guard’s Port Access Route Study will be an 
important first step toward implementing more meaningful safety and 
protective measures for the Bering Strait region. The study should 
recommend measures such as the adoption and implementation of vessel 
routing systems, vessel reporting systems, and vessel traffic services. 
Pursuant to the provisions of SOLAS, the United States should work 
with the Russian Federation and other nations to propose these measures 
to the IMO for adoption. The United States should also work with 
international partners to recommend the designation of special areas and 
the expansion of the North American emissions control area pursuant to 
MARPOL. The United States can also play a meaningful role in the 
formulation of the mandatory Polar Code by having its representatives 
advocate for stronger safety and environmental standards in the Code. 
Finally, the United States should consider coordinating with the Russian 
Federation and others in the international community to propose 
designating the Bering Strait region as a PSSA. A Bering Strait regional 
PSSA could incorporate many of the foregoing safety and environmental 
protection mechanisms as associated protective measures, providing the 
area with a suite of meaningful protections. Recognizing the Bering 
Strait region as a PSSA would serve to underscore the region’s 
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ecological importance—and vulnerability—to the world’s maritime 
community. 
  
